

Europeanization – Ambiguity of a Term

by Detlef Puhl

1. Thanks for invitation

This is my first real invitation by Manfred Gänsdorfer. In Garmisch, where we both used to work, I used to invite him for some workshops of mine to share his expertise. And I invited myself to his seminars. Now, he really asked me to come. And it is a great pleasure and honor for me to really be his guest. I'm happy to be here. Thank you very much.

I was asked to speak about “Europeanization – ambiguity of a term”. And so, I have to confess right at the beginning: I LOVE AMBIGUITIES – not in every circumstance and not all the time. But they reflect political reality. In former times, we would have talked about contradictions. I prefer the term “ambiguities“. We have to live and work with them all the time. They make up political life.

In the context of this symposium on Europeanization of the education of officers, let me offer you some food for thought. What do we mean, what MAY we mean when we talk about Europeanization?

I will address this topic in 3 parts:

1. What is EUROPE?
2. What is EUROPEANIZATION?
3. What should be achieved?

2. What is Europe?

Don't worry, I won't start with Adam and Eve or the Greek Goddess who provided this continent with her name. I suggest looking at “Europe“ in different categories – most of them are familiar to you. Here, I have the chance to list them all and invite you to reflect on them in one and the same context.

2.1 Category One

Europe is defined as a *geographic entity*. This gives us a fair and clear definition: A country is part of Europe if it is located completely or partially on the European continent. This carries at least two interesting informations: Morocco and Israel are NOT EUROPEAN countries; there is no way for them to become members of EU (Morocco had indeed applied for membership many years ago; and certain friends of Israel would like to see this country linked to the EU very closely, by some sort of “special relations“, even including membership). Secondly: Russia and Turkey clearly ARE EUROPEAN countries, because part of their territory is on European soil, and not the least important (In Russia, about 80% of the population live in the European part of Russia; its most important cities are in the European part, not only Moscow and St. Petersburg; in Turkey, the European part is very small, but its former capital Istanbul leaves a very distinct footprint). Now, inspite of this, we already find ambiguity. If the Caucasus is Europe’s geographic demarcation line to the south, are the countries south of the Caucasus European? Armenia? Azerbaidjan? Georgia? They claim to be. It is obvious that geography alone is not enough for our needs to define “Europe“.

2.2 Category Two

Europe is defined as an *economic entity*. Here, the definition is less clear. Of course, as a “European Union“, Europe is an economic entity. But even that is not entirely true; to this day, only 15 of 27 member states have adopted the common currency. And then there are European countries which are not part of the Union. There’s also the “European Economic Space“ which adds former EFTA countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein) to the EU’s Internal Market regulations. On the other hand: The economy today is global, and it is dynamic. Let me give you an example of what I mean: Before joining the European Community in 1973, the UK, although clearly a European country, was not very “European“ as far as its economy was concerned; strong links still tied it to the countries of the British Commonwealth. That has changed completely since then. Also, the importance of the European market varies from business to business, from branch to branch; from country to country. The economic part of our definition of Europe helps only in terms of rules and regulations for economic activity: here are countries which have adopted and apply European rules and regulations (EU, EES), others do not. But this may change over time. And

there are countries outside Europe with strong economic ties to Europe, which also play by the same rules. And these rules, by the way, are being adapted to global standards to enable global free trade. So, while geographic Europe is where it is, economic Europe is moving: mostly forward, setbacks are possible, and it is an integral part of a global economic system. The economic “Europe” as a definition is only of relevance as it extends beyond the pure economic aspect into the questions of social standards and regulations. The “free trade Europe” alone doesn’t mean very much, as it is part of a world wide system of more or less free trade. Therefore, the economic category is not enough to define “Europe”, for it is more than that, more than just an economic entity.

2.3 Category Three

Europe is defined as a *historic entity*. Those who preach the optimistic “look forward” and to leave the past behind, tend to forget how important history still is for today’s policy makers. Manfred Gänsdorfer and I could witness this during our time in Garmisch, where we had to do with military officers and government officials from Central and Eastern Europe. “History” was always present in their minds as we discussed political issues of today. For our purpose, this definition by history can tell us three things:

- a) Russia and Turkey clearly are part of Europe, because they’re part of European history, part of our history. Asia Minor is as well; when you see the ruins of Greek and Roman cities there, it is obvious that this is part of European history. They left their traces behind. And who am I to tell Austrians what the impact of both powers on Southeast Europe was over centuries!! So, from a historic perspective, there’s no ambiguity whatsoever as to this qualification. One might even argue that Arabs are part of European history – but this may be a bit too far back in history and only true for a small part of Europe.
- b) Also the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand are, in a way, part of European history. They definitely are part of European “heritage”, and thus share the European system of values.
- c) Europe’s history is a history of movement, of migration, of mixture of people and languages. All peoples on the European continent can open up their box of history of interchange, of expansion and defense, thus of war and fighting for power, for territory, for money, for honor.

All this tells us that Europe has some sort of “collective memory”, a memory of war against each other, but also a memory of common bonds, of common rulers and common enemies, of common education and of common life. Take this institution, this building, we are in; this is a house of European history which has seen our military predecessors from 200 years ago from almost all of the countries present today being trained and educated here in their academy. And this plays into today’s politics, especially at our neighbors’ to the east whose 50 or so lost years are a direct consequence of Europe’s recent history. Both, the Western and the Eastern part of Europe are today confronted with their respective perceptions of this historic entity, which needs to be adapted. After all, during the Cold war, for most of us in Western Europe, this was identical with “Europe” while the East became some sort of an unknown dark grey zone behind the “Iron Curtain”; and for many in the East, who weren’t allowed to share our experience of integration, the long dreamt of restoration of historic unity suddenly brought to mind that that restoration wasn’t just a coming home, the fixing of a broken link; it meant creating a number of completely new links. So, yes, this historic entity exists but its perception varies, and therefore the way in which this plays into national or regional politics. But history is a fundamental element of the definition of “Europe”. It takes different forms in different countries, because experience and perception of a common history are and remain different.

2.4 Category Four

Europe is defined as an *entity of common values*. Derived from its common history, “Europe” can be defined by a set of common values. They are by and large the “Western values” which already tells us that, again, a definition takes us way beyond Europe. It is a fact, though, that the concepts of democracy, of rule of law, of religious freedom are common to Europe – not only to Europe, but these concepts are clearly part of our heritage. It is here that they were formulated, fought for, enacted – and betrayed as well, but also resurrected. Unfortunately, these common values, for a certain time, included also missionary expansionism, colonialism, imperialism, racism, and the ambition to dominate. These “values”, by no means exclusively European, keep their impact on Europe, as they serve today, in most parts, as “lessons learned”, as a basis for “never again” – in fact, reversing them was the precondition for the concept of European integration. So, countries

which adhere to such “European values” may not only be European, but they would support democratic principles for the organization of society and they would make the “lessons learned” process and the correction of wrong policy decisions a constitutive and normal part of their political system. Again, this definition helps us tell which criteria have to be met to be “European”, but it is by no means restricted to Europe; in fact, these values tend to be defined as global, as human values. This takes me to.

2.5 Category Five

Europe is defined as a *political entity*. This definition includes countries which meet all or most of the above mentioned criteria and have subscribed to a political project. And yet, there is more than one “Project Europe” we have to be aware of.

2.5.1 56 countries are part of the “Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe” (OSCE)

This will be remembered in Vienna!! This project, as you all know, extends way beyond Europe, to include not only the US and Canada, as our allies, but also the now independent republics of Central Asia who used to be part of the Soviet Union. These countries have (although with very questionable value records) remained engaged in this project, and intend to assume, with Kazakhstan, for the first time leadership in this organization.

2.5.2 47 countries are members of the “Council of Europe”

The first European organization to have been created after World War II, which, as you also know, focuses not only on questions of human rights and rule of law. It provides a legally binding Convention of Human Rights with the possibility of direct appeal by individual citizens to independent juridical oversight. And it provides its members with the right and the possibility to look into each other’s backyard, as they have all, or most, subscribed to the same rules. Hence, questions of human rights are no longer “internal affairs” for its members.

2.5.3 27 countries are members of the European Union (EU)

A confederation of states with the most comprehensive integrative approach ever seen in history, with two more countries negotiating at present their

membership, and at least seven more countries having expressed their desire to join as well, and with the ambition to form a political union which can act as a global player, not only in economic affairs, but in international affairs, including security, as well. The most recent developments in and about Georgia in the Caucasus make us all very much aware of this.

All this means “Europe”. Means “political Europe”. And as we see, and you know, this “political Europe” can mean different things to different people. We use the same word, but mean different things. “Europe” can sound very good – because you can understand so many different things by it and don’t have to really identify. “Europe” can also sound very bad, as it can be made responsible for everything that goes wrong, that governments don’t seem to be able to handle. “Europe” is so vague, so ambiguous that it can be used/misused by so many. And, yet, at the same time it’s very real, very present, very concrete.

What does this mean for the purposes of education in this context? It simply means that you have to be careful in using this word. Be sure to make clear what you mean; beware that it can mean something very different from what you intended it to mean.

Even if we restrict the use of “political Europe” to the context of the EU, the word still remains ambiguous. For, what do we mean when we talk about the EU?

1. A big Common Market to enhance welfare for all?
2. A Social Union to guarantee minimum social standards for all?
3. An Economic/Monetary Union to impact on globalization, make the interior market work, and set rules for the world economy?
4. A Political Union to set common standards for free movement of people and to provide security for all? Deal with the issue of migration, both legal and illegal?
5. A Political Union as an actor in international affairs with its own agenda, its own means to shape international politics in the interests of its member states? As regards Georgia? Or Russia? Or China? Or any other international actor?
6. A Political Union disposing of military means, free to decide to use them in the interest of its member states?
7. All this, again, and much more can be understood when we talk about the EU, taking it for “Europe”.

I now go one step further: The EU, as it is today, could only succeed because of its ambiguities, because different people, different actors could continue to understand different things without having to spell them out, without having to fight for principles, but to be able to accommodate, to keep policies compatible in very concrete actions. It is for these ambiguities, or for this flexibility that the big changes after 1989 could take place without blowing the old European Community to pieces.

Before 1989, “Europe” was the “European Community”, and, sorry, Austria was not part of “Europe”!! Today, Romania is “Europe”. All can be engaged in the same political project, although we carry with us very different kinds of experiences, because the project itself remains ambiguous, or should we say: open? – concrete enough to create incentives. The more diverse “Europe” became, the more important it is to remain ambiguous, which means nothing else than

1. leave doors open for making different kinds of steps to reach the goal, according to different standards,
2. leave the possibility to pick and choose opt-outs if that makes decisions to adhere to the program easier,
3. but to define a common framework, subtle enough to keep the different steps and the opt-out clauses compatible with the overall project.

So, “Europe” is many things at the same time. You know that. There is not ONE definition, but several definitions which have to be kept compatible with each other within an agreed common framework. This is the most serious challenge for our politicians who are in charge.

3. What is Europeanization?

“EuropeanIZATION signifies movement; development, process, some sort of action, both within this framework and/or to extend this framework. And this again can mean different things:

- a) Making things *more European than they were before*;
- b) Making things *European that were not before*;
- c) Making things *perceived as being European that were not recognized as such before*.

Let’s take a closer look at what this can be.

3.1 Making things more European than they were before

The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) today is a fine example of what it means to make things more European than they were before.

1. Since 1999, we have the "Helsinki Headline Goals", developed into "Headline Goals 2010"; since 2003 we have the "European Security Strategy", to be complemented this year at the end of the French Presidency; since 2004 we have the "Battle Group Concept", developed into a rotating system of combat ready battle groups since 2007. We translate words into deeds, programs into capabilities; the European footprint becomes stronger. We develop concepts into reality.
2. In this context, it is fairly easy to say what Europeanization is: The strengthening of the military (or diplomatic or police) means at the disposal of the EU; the development of existing capabilities into solid tools for European policy making. However, there is, as you know, a fundamental dispute: If "Europeanization" means "more Europe than before", does this mean "less Nato than before", for example? Or "less something else"? Is this a shift from one priority to another? Is this a zero-sum-game? This is a constant concern not only for our US partners, but for many European partners as well. Or can we organize this as a "win-win-game", which is what our political leaderships in Paris and Berlin, for example, say. Basically, it will depend on what definition of "Europe" you adhere to and how much "more Europe" you want, and to do what.

3.2 Making things European that were not before

CFSP is also a fine example of what it means to make things European that were not before.

1. Until 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht, (or until 1989/90, when that treaty was negotiated), foreign and security policy in the framework of the European Community (EC) was taboo. For this, we had Nato, to which also the European defense alliance "Western European Union" (WEU) had delegated all military aspects; and for the political aspects of security policy, we had developed the European Political Cooperation (EPC), explicitly outside the EC framework. But both, the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union with the Euro (€) as its masterpiece, and German unification made for an opportunity to develop the political side of the medal called Internal Market, the deepening of the Common Market.

2. But also the creation of € itself was “Europeanization” of monetary policy which it was not before. And the creation of the “Schengen Space”, today including the “Frontex” structure for control of the EU’s external borders and a common visa policy, are a typical example of such Europeanization, the transfer of authority from the nations to the EU.
3. Here, we have another dispute: Does Europeanization mean “communitarization”, does it develop and enhance the community method of EU integration and its rules and regulations? Or does it mean enhancement of intergovernmental cooperation? This is important for the question of funding, for example. Common funding of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is an issue, but ESDP is “pillar 2”, intergovernmental. Where would the money come from? National contributions? Or the EU budget? Or an extra budget for the High Representative, as the French Presidency proposes? And who then controls spending? The European Parliament? According to which rules and to which procedures?

3.3 Making things perceived as being European that were not recognized as such before

Finally, how can we enhance the perception of things being European? This amounts to the question of how we can “europeanize” our minds. That is: Not Europeanization of decision-making, but of everything preceding it: ideas, thoughts, opinions, debates, considerations; and of everything following it: lessons learned, criticism, conclusions, follow-ups.

This is precisely where this symposium comes into play. It is part of the latter effort – to europeanize education, formation, based on lessons learned and on criticism. And this effort should extend into three different levels: a) contents, b) procedure, c) participants. This means: European topics, ideas have to be part of the curriculum of this education. European rules and procedures have to be trained and put into relation with national rules and procedures. All this has to be done to participants from all over Europe. This is how you can create a group of people who have the chance to develop a group feeling, based on a common ground of knowledge about facts and methods.

So far, I looked back; I tried to describe what “Europeanization” may mean, and what definitions of Europe will have to be considered in this context. Now, let me finish by adding a few thoughts on the future, on what should Europeanization of the education of officers achieve?

4. What should be achieved?

The notions of security and defense have, especially in the past 10 years or so, extended way beyond military issues. Our European Security Strategy declares military means to be just one of many at our disposal to manage or prevent crises, to provide security – not even the most important part, when we look at the list of threats to our security as defined in that strategy. I just read a book about the crisis immediately leading to World War I – what a different world this was!! What a different behavior of actors, what a different state of mind!! We have to look back from time to time to realize the changes that took place. And we shouldn't only look back to 1945!

You are military officers. Your jobs have changed dramatically over the past 10 years. As the military became relatively less important to provide security, you had to learn to go on military missions, not to defend your country against an invader, but to participate in providing security for others. In this context, "Europe" has developed a special meaning.

Since 2003, the EU has, for the first time in its existence, a "security strategy". It describes fairly well what its members collectively consider to be the primary threats to our security today. None of these threats requires a minimum number of army corps or divisions at a certain front with a precise mechanism for mobilization. That was what military always had to prepare for and train for. What is required today is: mobility, agility, flexibility on the ground, intelligence, everything from a high-tech fighter to a reconstruction worker to a local diplomat.

All this is required for military action mostly in an international or European context. No European country is planning for any military action in a purely national setting (perhaps with a few exceptions). Thus, the recent French White Book, although insisting on a leading role for France in international security affairs, stresses that the build-up of European capabilities, a Europeanization, is a very important part of its strategic priorities, especially during the French EU presidency. In particular, Paris wishes to establish a sort of "Erasmus Program for Military" to enable the EU to plan and conduct its own operations. The recent German White Book insists on multinational integration of the Bundeswehr, as well as the integration of military and non-military means to plan and conduct EU-operations.

In this situation, Europeanization is one way to match the new challenges – not the only one, but perhaps the preferable one. What would be the

alternative? Create niche capabilities within Nato under US leadership; or carry the burden of full-spectrum armed forces with limited capabilities. At the same time, Europeanization is a very difficult way out. There, I see three challenges:

1. In order for European armed forces to be compatible and able to form one “Europeanized” capability, a lot of coordination among the nations has to be done on: equipment, doctrine, structures, procedures, common language. This has immediate consequences for national decisions on procurement, on research and development, on training. All this will have to be Europeanized.
2. In order for European armed forces to be mission capable and able to form one “Europeanized” capability, policy making in all member states has to account for multinationality in their respective decision-making processes, in the organization of their political responsibilities, in their generation for public support. This has direct consequences for the roles of national bureaucracies and military staffs, but also for the roles of parliaments. This also, logically, ought to be Europeanized.
3. In order for European armed forces to be put to legitimate and effective use, its commonly agreed mission has to be based on common ideas, common analyses, not only of a practical goal to achieve, but also, more generally, on common ideas on when and how to use military force, when and how to organize civil-military cooperation, common international ambitions. This has critical impact on and is at the same time dependent on given ethical standards, the accepted role of religion, the shared value of democracy. This, then, also has to be part of Europeanization.

In each case, this is clear, “Europeanization” does not only mean: process of integration. It also means distinction, separation from others.

So, the new challenges to security, as defined in our common strategy, and shared, by the way, by our American friends and others, which already have changed your jobs so much and probably will continue to do so, call for new behaviour, for new relationships – within the hierarchy of armed forces, among different government agencies, between government agencies and NGOs, among nations. All this will have to be reflected in a new form of education – a Europeanized education.

5. Open End?

Taking all these considerations into account, will this be an adequate framework for modern education for European officers? You (military) know better than I do (civilian) that plans and strategies are good for day one; the rest needs to be improvised.

All my thoughts did not put into question the newest threat analysis, as defined in our Security Strategy. But, what if ... ?

1. What if European soldiers will find themselves engaged for the long haul in securing a fragile Middle East settlement?
2. What if European soldiers are asked to show presence in the Caucasus to prevent war and chaos, if the latest developments in and around Georgia make for engaging more than 200 observers without arms?
3. What if European forces are asked to “play with the big boys” or are challenged by them: Americans, Russians, Chinese?
4. What if European military is called upon, more than now, by diplomatic services or NGOs to support their efforts?
5. Are these scenarios completely out of this world? Do you have to think of other scenarios? For the past 20 years, almost all of our strategic assumptions, which always looked absolutely convincing at the time, were burnt to ashes. Who tells us that today’s assumptions will hold and that our transformation efforts, based on our assumptions, will be the right ones?

Europeanization means that all the answers to such questions will one day, in one way or another, have to be given by “Europe”, however you define it. What does this mean for Austria? For France? For Germany? Or any other European nation? Or any nation in general? To these questions, there can be no ambiguous answers.

European Union: just an alliance or a military alliance?

by Trevor C. Salmon

In the last twenty years or so, the European Union has tried to come to terms with the sardonic comment of Mark Eyskens:

‘L’Europe est un géant économique, un nain politique et, pire encore, un ver de terre lorsqu’il s’agit d’élaborer une capacité de défenses.’¹⁾

If one now looks at the achievements since 1991 one might want to suggest that the European Union has made great strides in not being a military worm and indeed in becoming an alliance or even a military alliance.

The European Union has seen:

- the momentum started by the San Malo agreement between Chirac and Blair in 1998;
- the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999;
- the European Security Strategy of 2003;
- a number of military and civil crisis management operations conducted under the auspices of the ESDP, including at least three high-level peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as a civil-military operation in Darfur and a military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo;
- the creation of an EU Military Committee and a EU Military Staff including a Situation Centre;
- the creation of a small operational planning cell of 30-40 personnel within the EU Military Staff in Brussels operating in parallel with a European cell based within SHAPE;
- the creation of fifteen battlegroups, which are military forces under the direct control of the European Council, each consisting of at least 1500 combat soldiers. most of which consist of multi-national contributions;

¹⁾ Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf and, even worse, a worm until it concerns itself with elaborating a defence capability. Mark Eyskens of Belgium 1991, www.wsws.org/articles/1999/sep1999/belg-s13.shtml.

- the creation of Gendarmerie Force, although not technically an EU force;
- the creation of the European Defence Agency, to help member states improve their defence capabilities and to enhance the EU's armaments cooperation, its defence industry and defence research and technology. The EDA has agreed a voluntary code of conduct relating to defence procurement;
- in the second half on 2008 the French Presidency's initiative to make sure that ESDP has credible resources so that the EU can be a global player;
- in the Lisbon Treaty the statement that 'If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States'.

It is by no means clear, that apart from the rhetoric of Schuman in 1950 about a 'European Federation', the Treaty of Rome's 1957 emphasis on 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe', and the TEU 1992 decision to 'establish among themselves a European Union', what the Europeans actually meant to achieve by European integration, especially in terms of foreign policy, security and defence. The bezazz, however, has now gone.

It is true that the nature of the EU cannot be understood by a formal, legalistic study of the provisions of the formal treaties alone. It must be located within a wider political environment. Full cognisance needs to be given to the political developments and aspirations, especially given the belief in spillover, that the economic integration was intimately related to political integration, and would lead to common foreign and defence policies.

An obvious difficulty is that while many might agree with these broad objectives, all sorts of different means for achieving them have been pursued. The Member States have different visions of the future of European integration. Some of these disputes have external repercussions – for example, is Europe progressing towards a federal system or retaining inter-governmentalism? The answer to that contributes to a dispute about the 'Rapid Reaction Force' – if the EU is 'just' an economic arrangement (customs union plus EMU) why does it need a defence force? On the other hand, if the Member States are aiming at a federal union, then the EU needs a CFSP and a ESDP. Moreover,

the EU 27 have had very different ways of contributing to international security: neutrality, non-nuclear, nuclear, full alliance membership etc. and have never really agreed which was best. An equally important issue is whether Europe should go for the 'Atlantic European defence' (predominantly NATO and US dependent) or the 'European Europe' defence as favoured by the French. This debate is still on-going.

One issue traditionally has been whether the EC/EU has aspired to be a non-military power or aspire to a superpower status. Duchêne argued that:

'The European Community's interests as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force is as far as possible to *domesticate* relations between states ... This means trying to bring to international problems the sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics which have in the past been associated almost exclusively with 'home' and not foreign, that is *alien*, affairs'²⁾.

Johan Galtung had other ideas. In *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (no question mark) he argued that 'a new superpower is emerging'.³⁾ According to Galtung there was an effort to recreate:

1. a Eurocentric world, a world with its center in Europe;
2. a unicentric Europe, a Europe with its center in the West.

This is possible because the EEC had 'resource power' and 'structural power', and Galtung uses these to develop a structural analysis which puts most play on dominant classes or economic interests. In fact, neither then nor afterwards did the EC/EU mood or predilections justified his claim.

For forty years, after some of these comments, the EC/EU collectively failed to see the connection between foreign, security and defence – or they considered that their primary security needs were taken care of by NATO and the US. But despite wanting to restore European influence, the EC/EU failed to see that the world situation required military power, and that diplomatic activity or economic activity without the potential to resort to military power could only be partially successful. Military power is the

²⁾ François Duchêne, 'The European Community and the uncertainties of independence' in M. Kohnstamm and W. Hager eds., *A Nation with large foreign-policy problems before the European Community*, (London, Macmillan, 1973).

³⁾ Johan Galtung, *The European Community: a superpower in the making*, (London, George Allan, 1981) p.12.

ultimate tool for protecting and promoting their vital interests. On occasion, force or the threat of force, is the only means whereby they may achieve their objectives. Henry Kissinger was right when he said that:

‘in a society of sovereign states, a power can in the last resort indicate its interpretation of justice or defend its vital interests only by a willingness to employ force’⁴⁾.

For too long the EC/EU forgot that, and did not really envisage the use of force until 1998-1999.

Central argument

In December 2002 the Defence Working Group of the Convention chaired by Michel Barnier argued that “the security and defence policy makes a powerful contribution to the Union’s international credibility,” and that the aim of the policy was “not to transform the EU into a military alliance but to provide it with the instruments it needs to defend its objectives and its values.”⁵⁾ However, the issue of whether or not the ideals or the working practices of such a policy should, or could, be characterised as an alliance is an issue of longstanding contention. In 2004 Bruno Tertrais authored a section in *The Washington Quarterly* entitled: *Europe: Alliance in the Making*. He argued that:

‘[T]he EU’s emerging common defense policy appears one of the most original and interesting developments in the long history of military alliances’⁶⁾.

Indeed, the very language of the Constitutional Treaty⁷⁾ and of the Lisbon Treaty⁸⁾ is considered ambiguous in terms of the alliance question. In the Lisbon Treaty, Article 24 ‘Chapter 1 General Provisions on the Union’s External Action’ 1(a) it states that the EU will:

‘safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity.’

⁴⁾ Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, (New York, Harper and Row, 1957) p.4.

⁵⁾ The European Convention, *Final Report of the Working Group VIII – Defence* (2002), para. 50 and 51.

⁶⁾ B. Tetrais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 27/2 (2004) p.147.

⁷⁾ Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe (2005) p.7.

⁸⁾ Official Journal of the European Union C306 Vol 50 17 December 2007 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty of European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007.

‘Section 2 Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy’
is states:

49) (a) 1

‘The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security using capabilities provided by the Member States’

(b) (i) 2

‘The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements’

(c) 3

‘Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy ...’

(c) 4

‘Decision ... shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously ...’

(c) 7

‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.’

Article 28 C

1. ‘Within the framework of the decisions ... the Council may entrust the Implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task ...’

Then there is the Solidarity Clause – Title VI Article 188R 1

*‘The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or mad-made disaster. **The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States to:***

(a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;

(b) protect democratic institutions ...;

(c) assist... in the event of a terrorist attack’⁹⁾.

The arguments of both Barnier and Tertrais are definition dependent. Therefore, the European Union may, or may not be considered an alliance, or a military alliance, depending on the strength of emphasis placed on the **definition of alliance**. Although alliances have always been a fixture of international relations, there is no single definition that can encapsulate the multitudes of alliances that have existed since Thucydides. “Alliances are instruments of statecraft” and stem from “expediential calculation”¹⁰⁾ and it remains the individual responsibility of states to make their own calculation as to the advantages and disadvantages of alliances, the form of alliance and the nature of the contract, if there is one.¹¹⁾

Analysis of alliance theory

According to Robert L. Rothstein: “the specific character of alliances differs in various historical periods.”¹²⁾ It is also true that alliances are generally amorphous, and that most definitions are too broad and vague and lack clarity. Alliance is a “widely and often imprecisely-used term”¹³⁾ with Tertrais making complaint of “the laxity” with which experts and officials use the descriptor.¹⁴⁾

⁹⁾ A political Declaration, which has no legal force, states that none of this ‘is intended to affect the right of another Member State to choose the most appropriate means to comply with its own solidarity obligation towards that Member State’.

¹⁰⁾ R.L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968) pp.46-47.

¹¹⁾ J.D. Morrow, ‘Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security’, *International Organization* 47/2 (1993), p.208.

¹²⁾ R.L Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* p.46.

¹³⁾ B.M. Russett, ‘An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances’, *The Midwest Journal of Political Science* 15/2 (1971) p.262.

¹⁴⁾ Tetraais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,’ p.149.

However at the other end of the spectrum it can be argued that alliances can only be defined under the terms of military aid, as exemplified in the Article V clauses in the Brussels Treaty or the North Atlantic Treaty. The former promising “all the military and other aid and assistance in their power” and the latter “such action as it [ie. the ally not the party attacked] deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”¹⁵⁾ In 1965 Charles Marshall called NATO “an alliance undiluted.”¹⁶⁾ The numbers of alliances since 1815 ranges from 112, 164, 177, 184 to 207 depending on the characteristics used to describe alliances.¹⁷⁾

There is also the problem of how to categorise arrangements that have traditionally fallen outside the traditional alliance definition (alignments, coalitions, pacts, blocs, ententes, collective defence and collective security, neutrality and non-aggression pacts, international regimes, universal and regional charters or covenants, unilateral guarantees, general commitments or international rules (UN), regional peace (OSCE) or the Geneva Conventions.¹⁸⁾ There is also the problem that for some the relationship can become so interdependent and the identity of certain interests so obvious that they act as “if they were allied”, and do not need a formal commitment, treaty or alliance to codify this arrangement.

The multitude of different alliances that have existed in international relations raises the question: How much can alliances stray from a core definition before they are considered not to be an alliance? There has to be some notion of precision but the lack of consensus on this issue is problematic. This is particularly true if one accepts Fedder’s notion that the key is to see “[a]lliance as a military compact” and that “the mutual enhancement of the military security facilitates distinguishing alliance from other types

¹⁵⁾ Treaty of Brussels (1948); NATO Handbook (2002).

¹⁶⁾ C.B. Marshall, *The Exercise of Sovereignty* (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1965) pp.58-59.

¹⁷⁾ J.D. Singer and M. Small, ‘Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description’, *Journal of Peace Research* 3/1 (1996) p.6; J.D. Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances’, *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (1991) pp.904-933; K.T. Gaubatz, ‘Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations’, *International Organisations* 50 (1996) pp.109-130; D.S. Bennett, ‘Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration: 1816-1984’, *American Journal of Political Science* 41/3 (1997) p.846.

¹⁸⁾ For a fuller discussion on these issues see: Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances’, p.906; S. Walt, *The Origin of Alliances* (Ithaca: NY, 1987); Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*; A. Smith, ‘Alliance Formation and War’, *International Studies Quarterly* 39/4 (1995) p.410; E.H. Fedder, ‘The Concept of Alliance’, *International Studies Quarterly* 12/1 (1968).

of international coalitions.”¹⁹⁾ Or as Friedman argues “[what] distinguishes alliances from other experiences of international cooperation, such as integration, multi-national community building, and economic partnership is the presence of an enemy and the prospect of military engagement.”²⁰⁾ This is significant given that historical alliance scholarship repeatedly asserted that the interests of allies are heterogeneous²¹⁾ whereas recent research has suggested “that the motives for alliance formation are more diverse” given the “impact of a variety of nonsecurity variables on the decision to ally.”²²⁾

For many, the signing of a treaty is “a unique dividing place along the spectrum”, since relations are “qualitatively different” compared to when no such treaty exists.”²³⁾ Although Walt argues that “an alliance is a formal or informal arrangement ...”²⁴⁾ the majority view alliances as a form of contract.²⁵⁾ Most alliances are not made out of principle but from expediency, based on promises²⁶⁾ and resting on credibility. There is no external, and neither often internal, mechanism for enforcing agreements, but usually states “choose to form agreements ... [if] there is a reasonable probability that cooperation will be successful.”²⁷⁾ A treaty to formalise the alliance tends to add precision and credibility to the partners’ understanding allowing others to know of their intentions.²⁸⁾ Occasionally however there

¹⁹⁾ Fedder, ‘The Concept of Alliance’, pp.68-69.

²⁰⁾ J.R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen (Eds.) *Alliance in International Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970) p.5.

²¹⁾ G.H. Snyder and P. Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations* (Princeton: NJ, Princeton University Press, 1977) p.428.

²²⁾ E. Gartzke and M.W. Simon, ‘Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies: Do Democracies Flock Together or Do Opposites Attract?’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40/4 (1996) p.618.

²³⁾ D. Reiter, ‘Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past’, *World Politics* 46/4 (1994) p.495.

²⁴⁾ Walt, *The Origin of Alliances*, 12.

²⁵⁾ G.H. Snyder, ‘Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut’, *Journal of International Affairs* 44/1 (1990); Reiter, ‘Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past’, 495; Leeds, ‘Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Interstate Dispute’, 429; H. Gärtner, ‘Small States and Alliances’ in E. Reiter and H. Gartner (Eds.) *Small States and Alliances* (Vienna: Physica-Verlag, 2001) p.2; G. Liska, *Nations in Alliance* (Baltimore:MD, The John Hopkins Press, 1962) p.3; Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration*, 4; Singer and Small, ‘Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description’, 4; Russett, ‘An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances’, 262-263.

²⁶⁾ J.D. Morrow, ‘Alliances, Credibility and Peacetime Costs’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38/2 (1994) p.270.

²⁷⁾ B.A. Leeds, A.G. Long and S.M. Mitchell, ‘Re-evaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises’, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44/5 (2000) p.687.

²⁸⁾ According to J.D. Morrow alliances ‘signal other states that the allies are more likely to come to one another’s aid’, and ‘operate as signals of the intentions of third parties to come to the aid of a threatened state’. (Morrow, ‘Alliances, Credibility and Peacetime Costs’ 280, 294). According to D.S. Bennett, an alliance is ‘a visible indicator of state commitments ... specified and mutually agreed upon set of behaviours.’ (Bennett, ‘Testing Alternative Methods of Alliance Duration 1816-1984’, 846.).

can be squabbles about what was intended, as each different partner has “different conception[s] of its alliance commitment”²⁹⁾ As Tetrais asks: “What does it really mean to be an ally in today’s dynamic world without a single definitive threat?”³⁰⁾

Some alliance theorists tend to argue that allies cannot control the nature of the promise or commitment, as if most alliances were blank cheques.³¹⁾ Alliances are indeed negotiable, as is the level of commitment to any given alliance and great care is often taken to ensure that designed alliances fall within certain conditions. Indeed, states are usually aware of the conflicts and obligations they wish to avoid³²⁾ and the marked difference between operative and inoperative alliances.³³⁾

Given that alliances are voluntary, there is the requirement of credible commitment and identity of interests whereby individual interests have to be complementary, or parallel, if not necessarily identical.³⁴⁾ Liska argues that alliances predicated on a sense of community must also be subject to a shared external threat.³⁵⁾ Indeed, a typical alliance covers only a small fraction of the total interests of each party, although on that fraction there may well be an underlying community of interests. However, mutual interests can also be shared between states that are antagonistic³⁶⁾ such as during the Nixon Presidency where the notion of *adversarial partners* – where states are allied only in relation to the shared threat and in no other respect – gained increasing acceptance.³⁷⁾ Indeed, alliances may become more fractious when positive interests are at stake (not in defending territory but in advancing into third party territory).

²⁹⁾ Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers*, 50.

³⁰⁾ Tetrais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, 148.

³¹⁾ Smith, ‘Alliance Formation and War’; and G.H. Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, *World Politics* 36/4 (1984).

³²⁾ The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 explicitly restricts the guarantee to ‘in Europe or North America’ (Article V) and ‘the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer’ (Article Vi) deliberately to avoid the United States having to bail out the empires of Europe in southeast Asia.

³³⁾ A.N. Sabrosky, ‘Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War’ in J.D. Singer (Ed.) *The Correlates of War II* (New York: Free Press, 1980); Leeds, Long and Mitchell, ‘Re-evaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises’.

³⁴⁾ Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances’, 931; K. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: 1979), pp.72-73.

³⁵⁾ Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, 12.

³⁶⁾ Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 166, quotes Churchill ‘If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least favourable references to the Devil’.

³⁷⁾ Partly in connection with arms control agreements. As Liska has noted: ‘an alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure ...’ (Liska, *Nations in Alliance*, 109).

Traditional realist theory dictates that in alliance formation, “security dominates, even compels alliance choices.”³⁸⁾ Classically, states form alliances in order to aggregate their capabilities, to add to the power of others, or to signal that they are withholding power. Because of such fears, most alliance theories focus on military power, military security and national security. Allies “value each other for the military assistance they can provide one another.”³⁹⁾ Wartime alliances, however, are for the express purpose of fighting and winning a specific conflict.

Holsti, Hopman and Sullivan argue that an alliance must be concerned with national security issues⁴⁰⁾. This criterion is troubling inasmuch as many established alliances do not fall into the category of dealing with life or death, and as Tertrais argues: “[a] broader definition of military alliances would include those that do not imply a security guarantee.”⁴¹⁾ Indeed, Mansfield and Bronson have argued that alliances play “a role in shaping pattern of commerce”, and that “gains from trade accrue to states with common security goals and bolster the aggregate political-military power of the alliance.”⁴²⁾

However, there remains one set of alliances not previously discussed, where an alliance becomes the “diplomatic rubric for conflict resolution, as when states resolve territorial claims and then sign an alliance to seal the bargain.”⁴³⁾ This of course does not have to rely just on territorial settlement alone, but could also apply to resolving the causes of the dispute or war. It appears that such arrangements are “more likely than all other alliances to reduce the incidence of war.”⁴⁴⁾

³⁸⁾ R.M. Siverson and H. Starr, ‘Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances’, *American Journal of Political Science* 38 (1994) p.147.

³⁹⁾ Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances’, 907; M. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1957); H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1973); Walt, *The Origin of Alliances*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

⁴⁰⁾ Holsti, Hopman, and Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration: International Alliances*.

⁴¹⁾ Tetrais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, 136.

⁴²⁾ E.D. Mansfield and R. Bronson, ‘Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements and International Trade’, *American Political Science Review* 91/1 (1997) p.94.

⁴³⁾ D.M. Gibler, ‘Alliances That Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty’, *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15 (1996) pp.75-98.

⁴⁴⁾ V. Krause and J.D. Singer, ‘Minor Powers, Alliance and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns’ in Reiter and Gartner, *Small States and Alliances*, 20; Gibler, ‘Alliances That Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty’).

There is no single definition of alliances. By their very nature, alliances fulfil a variety of purposes and the casus foederis can vary⁴⁵⁾. The prospect of examining the European Union in terms of alliance theory is largely unexplored area.

Criteria for categorisation

As discussed, alliances can have one or more characteristics that may or may not be overlapping and cumulative. However, “these various types are not always sharply distinguishable and the distinctions tend in practice to disappear.”⁴⁶⁾ Such characteristics can arguably be grouped as:

- I Values/Goals/Ideology/Mutual Benefit
- II Interests/Interdependence/Trade-offs/Wealth
- III Conflict Resolution/Territorial Settlement/Settlement of Disputes
- IV Cooperative Security/Common Security/Collective-oriented Security
- V De Facto/Tacit
- VI Adversarial Partners/Antagonist
- VII General Threat/Indefinite/Indistinct/No particular character
- VIII Against an Immediate Definite Threat
- IX Fighting
- X Wartime
- XI Attacking

A deeper investigation of these characteristics within the framework of the European Union suggests that the European Union *could* be classed as an alliance.

I. Values/Goals/Interests/Ideology/Mutual Benefit

According to the Paris Treaty of 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community was founded on the belief that the “contribution which an organised and vital Europe can make to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations” and that the new institutions would give direction

⁴⁵⁾ *Casus foederis*: Circumstances in a treaty requiring the action of the parties.

⁴⁶⁾ E.R.A. Seligman (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Social Science* (London: Macmillan, 1930).

“to a destiny henceforward shared ...”⁴⁷⁾ By 1957 the new agenda for the European Economic Community was to lay the foundations “of an ever closer union,” partly to “preserve and strengthen peace and liberty.”⁴⁸⁾ In 1992 the EEC became the European Community whose primary task was the establishment of a common market, economic and monetary union, growth, respect for the environment, economic convergence, high employment, social protection, raising the standard of living, and economic cohesion and solidarity.⁴⁹⁾ In the TEU of 1992 the Union was to respect the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. Article J of the TEU established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) whose objectives were:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- To preserve peace and security ...;
- To promote international cooperation;
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

All Member States pledged to support the Union’s policies and to refrain from any action which was contrary to the interests of the Union. However, there was exemption that such conditions would “not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy” of Member States, a provision that remains in the current treaties. Even if the CFSP objectives are understood to be little more than *motherhood and apple-pie* it remains that such objectives retain a certain level of meaning and obligation. Since the TEU was established in November 1993 the question is *what is this level of meaning and obligation?*

II. Interests/Interdependence/Trade-offs/Wealth

An essential criterion for establishing the Union was economic growth, economic interdependence, and the pursuit and re-distribution of economic inter-

⁴⁷⁾ Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951).

⁴⁸⁾ Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community (1957).

⁴⁹⁾ Treaty on European Union (1992), Article 2.

ests. Indeed, a component of economic and monetary union is convergence. The preamble of the original EEC Treaty established that the signatories were “anxious ... [to reduce] the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions.” The first enlargement of the Union in 1972 also saw the establishment of Protocol Number 30, recognising and citing the need to address the economic and social imbalances existent within the Union.⁵⁰⁾ The Single European Act of 1986 introduced a new title – Economic and Social Cohesion – reiterating the need to reduce the economic and social gap between different regions.⁵¹⁾ Originally these objectives were met by the periodically reformed Structural Funds but the TEU (Article 130d) created “a Cohesion Fund to provide a financial contribution” to compensate for divergences as EMU approached and was implemented.⁵²⁾ European Union finances for 2000-2006 reveal that 32% of a € 100 billion budget was appropriated to structural and cohesion funds.⁵³⁾ Similar deals were agreed for central and east European states, such as pre-accession deals.

The Union is an economic giant. In 2004, exports and merchandise trade (including intra-EU) accounted for 18% of the economy compared to the United States’ 11.9%. The EU was second only to the United States in merchandise trade with 18% of imports compared with the United States’ 20.7%. No other state came close to the figures for the EU and the US. If imports and exports are taken together (including intra-EU (25) trade) the EU accounts for 40.9% of global merchandise trade.⁵⁴⁾ In 2001 intra-EU trade (value of imports plus exports as % of GDP) ranged from 113.5% for Belgium down to 16.5% for Greece. For seven of the fifteen member states figures were over 40%.

III. Conflict Resolution/Territorial Settlement/Settlement of Disputes

World War I claimed the lives of approximately 8.5 million people and a further 21 million people were injured. In World War Two, 15-20 million combatants and 9-10 million civilians were killed. The enormous toll on human life led to a meeting in Geneva, 1944 where representatives of various resistance groups in Europe declared:

⁵⁰⁾ Treaty of Accession (1972), Protocol No. 30.

⁵¹⁾ Single European Act (1986), Bulletin Supplement 2.

⁵²⁾ It was confined to the ‘fields of environment and trans-European networks’.

⁵³⁾ S. Hix, *The Political System of the European Union (Second Edition)* (Houndmills, Palgrave, 2005) pp.289-295 and p.279.

⁵⁴⁾ International Monetary Fund, *Eurostatm* (02 August 2005), www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade.

‘During the lifetime of one generation Europe has twice been the centre of a world conflict whose chief cause was the existence of thirty sovereign States in Europe. It is a most urgent task to end this international anarchy by creating a European Federal Union’.⁵⁵⁾

In 1950, Schuman declared that the “coming together of the nations of Europe require[d] the elimination of the age-old oppositions of France and Germany” so that any war between them “becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.” By 1951, following in the footsteps of Schuman and Monnet, the original six: “Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests ... the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts.” Conflict resolution was high on the agenda of the founding fathers⁵⁶⁾ and was an integral part of the foundation “of an ever closer union” to “preserve and strengthen peace and liberty.”⁵⁷⁾ Indeed, the Preamble of the TEU recalled “the historic importance of the ending of the division of the European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future Europe.”⁵⁸⁾

The original vision of European interdependence has been sustained throughout the growth of the Union. During the 1990’s Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania all understood that neither their memberships to the EU and NATO were conditional upon settlements of continuing disputes with Russia, and of Lithuania’s continuing disputes with Poland.⁵⁹⁾

IV. Cooperative Security/Common Security/ Collective-orientated Security

According to former Danish Minister of Defence Hans Hækkerup, cooperative security means not the old-fashioned policies of balance of power (often the origin of alliances) but building security “through integration, webs of interdependence and networking.”⁶⁰⁾ The 2004 accession states

⁵⁵⁾ W. Eichler, *Europe Speaks* (London: Militant Social International, 1944).

⁵⁶⁾ Notwithstanding the arguments of Alan Milward in A.S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, (London: Routledge, 1992).

⁵⁷⁾ Treaty of Rome (1972).

⁵⁸⁾ Treaty on European Union (1992), Preamble.

⁵⁹⁾ P. Vares, ‘Estonia and Russia: Interethnic Relations and Regional Security’ in O.F. Knudsen (Ed.), *Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region* (London: Frank Cass, 1999) p.161.

⁶⁰⁾ H. Hækkerup, ‘From Adazi To Tuzla’, *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997* (Copenhagen: DUPI, 1997), pp.135-139.

in particular have socialised with their democratic partners in this regard, bringing them closer to the structure of European security. However, the same agenda has “entrench[ed] in them the values and principles incumbent upon members.”⁶¹⁾ Furthermore, Archer suggests that such partnerships have addressed ‘not only the practical and logistical matters of interoperability but also the more conceptual issues, ensuring a solid foundation is laid to support security.’⁶²⁾ All twelve new members had to accept and implement the formal (such as the CSFP and ESDP) and informal rules of the *acquis*⁶³⁾ and consequently became subject to Europeanisation.⁶⁴⁾

V. De facto/Tacit

States who joined the European Union in 1995 or 2004 did so with the understanding that they were joining a *de facto* or tacit alliance. For example, the Finns and the Estonians knew that there was no Article V guarantee, but acted under the assumption – based on the evidence at hand – that there was in fact an informal guarantee to the same end. By continually moving away from their Russian past, the Finns became *Europeanised* and there was a “covert recognition of a potentially considerable security bonus to be gained through EU membership.”⁶⁵⁾ Even without a formal hard security issue or guarantee as impetus, the Finns increasingly became aware that it might prove to be strategically better to be part of the EU than to remain linked with an increasingly authoritarian and perhaps even imperialist Russia. Such reasoning also proved to be the case for Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. In 1998 the President of Estonia argued: “When the EU does speak, the world listens – not only because of the Union’s financial power, but also because of who is a member of the EU.”⁶⁶⁾ Even if the EU does not directly deal with hardcore security or military issues, the EU represents considerable political and economic power. They believed they were joining a zone of peace and stability.

⁶¹⁾ Archer and Jones, (1999), p.176.

⁶²⁾ Archer and Jones, (1999), p.176.

⁶³⁾ With some exceptions. For example, the Schengen *acquis* was not included from the start.

⁶⁴⁾ K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (Eds.), *The Politics of Europeanization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁶⁵⁾ Arter, ‘The EU Referendum in Finland on 16 October 1994: A Vote For the West, Not For Maastricht’, 372.

⁶⁶⁾ HE.L. Meri, ‘Presentation by HE Mr. L. Meri, President of Estonia, at Royal Institute Services for Defence’, *RUSI Journal* 143/2 (1998), p.2.

VI. *Adversial Partners/Antagonist*

Adversial or antagonistic alliance structures have never existed within the European Union. Clearly there exist disputes between the member states concerning the particulars of economic or common security policies – indeed concerning a whole host of issues – but such disputes are democratic and are generally usurped by the shared political, economic, and ideological systems of the member states. However, a distinction must be made between *high* and *low* politics. While there has been steady progression in terms of *low* politics, disagreements between member states concerning issues such as Iraq and the Constitution demonstrate that there remains a high degree of member state partiality towards the national interest in terms of *high* politics.

VII. *General Threat/Indefinite/Indistinct/No particular character*

Alliance treaties may attempt to define the breadth and scope of agreements but such parameters are generally so broad as not to give real guidance in terms of policy. In 1995 and 1996, Greece lobbied hard for the inclusion of “a clear guarantee concerning protection of the external frontiers of the Union and the Member States and a mutual assistance clause,”⁶⁷⁾ an approach which was rooted in Greek concerns over their immediate proximity to Turkey, Cyprus and the Balkans. Likewise, the Irish Presidency Draft Treaty in December 1996 triggered a debate concerning the usage of the phrase *territorial defence* and how such language might infringe on the neutrality of several EU member states. The eventual wording was changed to “safeguard... the integrity of the Union.”⁶⁸⁾

In the run up to the 2003 European Council Javier Solana, High Representative of the CFSP, produced *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*⁶⁹⁾ that identified five key threats: terrorism, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. However, there is no real evidence of any detailed threat assessment to partner the identification of the threat. The same can be said of the Strategic Objectives and the Policy Implications for Europe – they read like an agenda not a programme. To date, nothing like a Defence White Paper has been produced, only vacuous phrasing so broad as to leave nothing

⁶⁷⁾ Memoranda of Greek Government (1996).

⁶⁸⁾ European Council, ‘General Outline for A Draft Resolution of the Treaties: Comment in Irish Presidency’ (1996); Treaty of European Union (1997), Art 11.1.

⁶⁹⁾ European Council, ‘European Security Strategy: European Council’ *EU Bulletin* 12 (2003b).

with which to disagree. Indeed, the final edition and its talk of “growing strategic threat” and “potentially the greatest threat” was not nearly as robust as an earlier version produced for the European Council which stated that “international terrorism is a strategic threat” and the proliferation of WMD “is the single most important threat to peace and security.”⁷⁰⁾

The EU may be in a position to respond to threats, or to take action against weapons proliferation (for instance, Concordia, Artemis and Althea military operations, Proxima police missions in the FRYOM, EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina,⁷¹⁾ the action in Justice and Home Affairs on organised crime and European Council talks between France, Germany, Britain and High Representative and Iran in 2004) but there is no strategy or culture to underpin the aspirations of the ESDP. The threats being faced by the EU are not only amorphous, they are indefinite, leaving the essential question: *Defence against what?*

There is no consensus as to the theoretical, philosophical or ideological culture of the defence strategy or of the territory that is to be defended. Nor indeed is there any consensus on whether or not the EU has a Near Abroad. In Luxembourg, 2003 the General Affairs and External Relations Council agreed the Wider Europe – New Neighbourhood paper which mentioned enlargement and *neighbours to the East and to the South* but could not pin-point the issues beyond general phrases such as *converging interests*, *shared values* and a *wish-list of aspirations*. Indeed, the 15 incentives of the EUs approach were generally regarded as being of the *motherhood and apple-pie variety*, once again urging the questions: *What can this mean in practice? What is the threat? Where is the threat to be found and why should members become involved?* As the Iraq War in 2003 demonstrated, the EU has no answer to such issues. Moreover the Petersberg tasks offer no further help as there is no geographical limit designated for their application,⁷²⁾ no definition of the term Task of Combat Forces (which usually, but not always, means a battle), nor has the definition of peacekeeping nor peacemaking been defined by the EU.

⁷⁰⁾ J. Solana, ‘Report on the Strategy of the EU’ (Thessaloniki: European Council, 2003).

⁷¹⁾ Proxima took over as a police mission from the EU’s peacekeeping mission Concordia in Macedonia, Artemis was in Democratic Republic of Congo, and Althea took over from NATO’s SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁷²⁾ ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping’ (Treaty of European Union (1997), Article 17.2) But it could be argued that the Petersberg tasks are part of CFSP, CFSP is global, and therefore, Petersberg tasks could be global.

VIII. *Against an Immediate Definite Threat*

The restriction of military security objectives in terms of both the CFSP and the Petersberg Tasks urges the question of whether or not the extant treaties established any progress towards eventually framing a genuine defence policy for the EU. The differences regarding what such a policy should entail is yet another point of discussion. According to the French, the EU requires a policy of common defence, but the British veer further towards a common policy of defence (a linguistic difference perhaps, but a meaningful difference nonetheless.) As was seen in the constitutional debates of 2003-2004 there was a marked difference between a British aversion to common defence (which they saw as equalling an integrated command) and the Franco-Germany proposal for common defence. Furthermore, the treaties have been amended so that the “eventual framing of a common defence policy” became the ‘progressive framing of a common defence policy’⁷³⁾ and there has been discussion as to the difference. One view is that *eventual* means a result some time in the future, whereas as *progressive* means moving towards it now and in an ongoing manner. If one abides by the latter definition, it could be argued that progressively the EU is forming an alliance.

IX. *Fighting*

There remains the very real possibility of EU forces being combat deployed in missions such as Concordia, Artemis and Althea. However, the reality of EU deployment, to date, remains confined to humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping.

X. *Wartime*

The EU has never gone to war. EU negotiators played a significant part in the diplomatic end-game regarding Yugoslavia (where the EU-15 managed to maintain a remarkable solidarity despite the particular concerns of some member states) but there has never been an outright declaration of war on the part of the EU.

⁷³⁾ Treaty on European Union and Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.4 and J.7. (Nicoll and Salmon, *Understanding the European Union*, 367).

XI. Attacking

Unless the Berlin statement is perversely taken as an indication of an attacking intention by the EU, the EU has never given any encouragement for attack.

Conclusions

a) The Irish ‘No’

One of the reasons that Ireland rejected the Nice Treaty in June 2001 by 50% to 46% was because a neutrality. In October 2002 by 63% to 37% the Irish voted YES. Finally, at the Seville summit, the European Council adopted a declaration by Ireland on its neutrality and reciprocated with its own declaration on ESDP and its effects on member states. The Irish declaration stated its participation in CFSP ‘does not prejudice its traditional policy of military neutrality.’ It went on to stress that ‘Ireland is not bound by any mutual defence commitment ... nor party to any plans to develop a European army.’ Ireland hoped that by having this declaration inserted into the Presidency Conclusions it might convince the Irish public to vote for the Nice Treaty in the autumn referendum, having rejected it once already, allegedly on the grounds that it would undermine Ireland’s neutral status. The Declaration of the European Council reinforced this effort by acknowledging Ireland’s policy of military neutrality and confirming that ‘the policy of the Union shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states.’⁷⁴⁾ The Irish population voted yes in the second referendum on the Treaty of Nice in October 2002, removing the major obstacle to the adoption and implementation of the treaty and perhaps indicating that the declaration had eased their fears of the Treaty impinging on Irish military neutrality.

On 12 June 2008 Ireland again went to the polls on a European Union treaty, and again the cry was heard that Ireland was sleepwalking into a European superstate with its own army, endangering Irish neutrality, a theme the hard left focused on during the campaign. Sinn Féin argued that the Irish definition of neutrality was based on international law, which implied that it is not only what you do with your troops, but what you do with your territory, your defence spending and whether you are part of military alliances.

⁷⁴⁾ Bulletin of the European Union 6-2002 Seville European Council.

While Ireland would have a veto in terms of sending troops aboard, Sinn Féin were concerned that over a series of treaties, there had been a slow but clear movement towards the build-up of a European defence capability. They felt that a stand-alone European defence capability is being put in place by the Lisbon Treaty. The Irish voted on 12 June by 53.45 to 46.6% to reject the treaty and throw Europe into turmoil.

b) Failure to adopt the Constitution or change the founding treaties of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty) is not significant in terms of the question of whether the EU is an alliance or indeed a military alliance.

The analysis above suggests that in the areas of the CFSP/ESDP, and more generally, the EU has developed an *acquis communautaire politique*. This has grown up since the evolution of the European Political Cooperation in the 1970's and 1980's, the transformation into the CFSP in 1993 and more recently the movement to the ESDP. Indeed, on some of the analysis above, and according to some definitions of alliance, even the core European (Economic) Community had begun to exhibit some characteristics of an alliance.

Rather like 'conventions' in the British constitution, habits, norms, conventions and expectations have grown up in the European Union. Much of the change to *le droit coutumier* has evolved out of public view, without treaties or constitutional changes. In other words the institutional and informal underpinnings – the frequency of meetings, the socialisation experience of being part of the Brussels-scene, the camaraderie of permanent officials and the guidance from the European Council and the Council of Ministers (whether in the form of hard law or not) has contributed to this *acquis communautaire politique*.

The analysis has showed that there is no single definition of alliances. Over time alliances have been categorised in a spectrum going from agreement on values, goals, ideology and mutual benefit to agreements for fighting and, indeed, attacking third parties. There is also a distinction between general alliances, which do not involve military activity and those that do.

The analysis shows that depending on the definition of alliances the European Union could be classed as an alliance. This is no academic point merely of interest to political scientists or strategists. For those who believed in the 1950's and 1960's that the vision of the Community was that of a civilian power, for those from former neutral and non-aligned states, for

those who still believe that they live in neutral or non-aligned states, this question matters. It also matters for members of alliances. Are they going to be responsible (directly or indirectly) for the defence of all the members of the EU? How long will they allow 'free riders' without beginning to ask the question of who is defending whom and what and why. If it is a community or a union with an identity of character, of fellowship, of interest, what are the consequences?

It also matters given the period of reflection that the European Union has entered into following the defeat in France and the Netherlands of the Constitution and after Lisbon Treaty was defeated this year. Part of this debate and the wider debate about the future of Europe are questions, such as:

- what are the aspirations of the member states of the European Union, of the politicians and of their public?
- is the European Union just a customs union, a single market or a currency zone or is it aiming to be something more?
- is the European Union aiming to become an international actor?
- if it is aiming to be more and an international actor, does that include security and defence?
- if it does include security and defence, what does that mean?
- does it mean that at some point that citizens of the European Union have to be committed to fight and die for one another?
- is the way to operationalise that via a common defence policy, a military alliance or common defence?

Perhaps given the evolving *acquis communautaire* the trend has already been set.

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The New Security Context of the European Union

by Franco Algeri

Introduction

Reforming the European Union (EU) is an ongoing challenge. Looking at the security environment of the EU in the early 21st century, it appears to be more than urgent to improve the foreign, security and defence political profile of the Union. In this context the former president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, asked already in 2001 – prior to the terrorist attacks in the United States in September of the same year – some crucial questions: “... if it is to exercise true leadership in the field of security, the Union will not be able, in the long term, to avoid a number of questions which have not hitherto been discussed: what cause would we all be willing to die for? How far can the efforts of technocrats “export stability”; when should human lives be put at risk? Can an entity with no political unity take action in the long term primarily by the allocation of funds? Does the Union have the financial and technological resources to guarantee its security?”¹⁾

Keeping these questions in mind and looking at the latest Russian-Georgian crisis, the French president and president of the European Council, Nicolas Sarkozy, expressed in the French Newspaper *Le Figaro* the necessity of the Lisbon Treaty.²⁾ According to his argumentation this treaty would offer institutional novelties by which the EU could react better to an international crisis. This refers primarily to the foreseen role of the President of the European Council as well as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – the latter would be supported by an External Action Service. However, against the background of current international developments it is of little help for the EU and the EU member states to speculate about supranational crisis management capabilities with a new institutional setting, new instruments and new actors as long as the EU is trapped in a reform crisis and the respective provisions are not entering into force.

¹⁾ Speech by Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission: For a strong Europe, with a grand design and the means of action, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 29 May 2001.

²⁾ Nicolas Sarkozy: La Russie doit se retirer sans délai de la Géorgie, in: *Le Figaro*, 18.08.2008, Online Ausgabe.

Furthermore, the reality of the EU's foreign, security and defence political development is not simply to be solved by institutional and bureaucratic arrangements. In order to understand the new security context of the EU two analytical dimension need to be considered. First, the EU external dimension and, second, the EU internal dimension. Concluding some illusions concerning the role of the EU and its foreign, security and defence policy will be critically highlighted.

I. EU external dimension

The EU has always been, is and will remain to be confronted with conflicts in its neighbourhood as well as in regions further away. Thus, to neglect the realities of such a security environment is impossible for the Union if European interests shall be realized. However, it needs to be considered, that the conflicts of today are mainly intra-state conflicts, while inter-state conflicts are on the decline. The recent conflict between Russia and Georgia has been the first inter-state conflict since the Iraq war in 2003. Intra-state conflicts need differentiated approaches to handle them, i.e. a mixture of civil and military instruments are important.

Furthermore, the security environment of the EU is characterized by an international order without clearly defined structures. What can be observed is an ongoing process of adapting to events. Different views of international relations exist and it is no longer as simple as in times of the East-West antagonism. Competing views of how a global structure should look like characterize the foreign policies of the United States, China, Russia and the EU. It is not just the competition of a unipolar versus a multipolar concept. There is also an ongoing debate about the pros and cons of unilateralism and multilateralism.

In such an environment the EU is moving between idealistic and materialistic interests. Idealistic interests are to promote the values and norms of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Materialistic interests comprise e.g. economic prosperity, market access on a global level or a regulated trade policy in the multilateral framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As concerns security interests, territorial integrity, energy security, human security or environmental security can be mentioned.

The promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights are not stand-alone aspects, but must be seen in context with other norms (e.g. labour

standards) that are fundamental to the EU's function as a social entity. The ways by which these norms are expressed in the external acting comprise a wide spectrum of instruments like political declarations, demarches, dialogue structures, or strategies towards and agreements with third countries and regions. These instruments are used in different ways and differ with respect to their effectiveness. It has been realized, for example, that preferential trade agreements are more effective than human rights agreements.³⁾ In most cases the EU applies not just one of these instruments but combines them according to the situation and necessity. Nevertheless, in a comparative view discrepancies and incoherence can be observed concerning the EU's external relations towards third countries.

Comparing e.g. the respective policies of the EU towards China on the one hand and Burma/Myanmar on the other hand shows diverging approaches. Today China is of utmost importance for the EU in economic and strategic terms. The People's Republic is the Union's second largest trading partner and defined as a strategic partner in the European Security Strategy. The importance of China for the EU has increased since the mid 1990s to such an extent that even the EU's Asia policy has become dominated by the Union's China policy. Compared herewith the case of EU-Myanmar relations shows that neither in economic nor in security political terms Burma/Myanmar does matter to the EU. However, this Southeast Asian country has become a permanent topic of concern in context of the EU's Asia policy and it can be used to show the continuous application of EU sanctions.

The economic and political importance of a country does directly influence the EU's policy of applying a foreign policy driven by norms. Considering such a differentiation in importance of third countries, one nevertheless still has to ask whether the approach of using sanctions proves to be effective? It is interesting to note, that the effect of sanctions as such has become more and more disputed. Do sanctions make a difference? Looking at the nonexistent changes of the situation in Burma/Myanmar, the question about the value of sanctions is a legitimate one. On the supranational level as well as on the national level, a debate can be observed concerning the effectiveness of sanctions and whether the EU should not reconsider the current system and

³⁾ Emilie M Hafner-Burton: Trading human rights. How preferential trade agreements influence government repression, in: International Organisation, Summer 2005, S. 593-629.

promote the concept of change through co-operation.⁴⁾ Linked herewith, the conditionality of agreements with third countries gains even more importance. The European Parliament as the main advocate for maintaining conditionality argued that the respect of norms is essential for the credibility of the EU's foreign policy. At the same time, the Parliament acknowledged that this might cause misunderstandings and frictions with third countries.⁵⁾

The case of the European integration process can be used as a positive example how norms can be established and strengthened in a regional context. Looking at the systemic nature of the EU as well as the development of European foreign policy explains to a certain extent existing deficiencies. The more comprehensive bilateral relations have been established between a third state and the EU as well its member states, in economic and political terms, the more the EU is reluctant to use negative political instruments. Furthermore, it can be assumed that according to the importance of a third state for European interests, the EU is using a policy of double standards when it comes to the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Compared to other regional integration forms, the case of the EU is unique. To apply this European model to other regions would be a rather vague endeavour. Historical, societal, political and economic experiences have to be taken into account for the development of a respective system. Nevertheless, the European experience offers positive as well as negative examples that can be analysed for developing adequate models in other regions.

II. EU internal dimension

A high degree of interdependence is characterizing the external relations of the EU and in order to guarantee the interests mentioned above, a comprehensive security approach is needed. Even though the EU is following an idealistic approach in its foreign, security and defence policy, the Union remains a restrained actor. Already since the Maastricht Treaty, followed

⁴⁾ Independent report for the European Commission: Supporting Burma/Myanmar's national reconciliation process. Challenges and opportunities. Brussels, January 2005. Hervé Jouanjean: National reconciliation and foreign assistance. The future of the people is our challenge, Brussels, 05.04.2005.

⁵⁾ Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 14. Juni 1995 zur Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat „Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen Asienstrategie“, C 166. 3.07.1995. Europäisches Parlament: Bericht des Ausschusses für auswärtige Angelegenheiten und Sicherheit über die Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und der VR China, Berichterstatterin Maria Adelaide Aglietta. A3-0011/94 PE 205.922 endgültig. 07.11.1994.

by the Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty this problem is apparent. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) – according to the Lisbon Treaty to be renamed Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – can be considered a most interesting example to demonstrate the difficulty of bringing together, on the one hand, an integrationist system and, on the other hand, an intergovernmental system. An inherent ambiguity of the European integration process as such can be realized.

Looking at the corresponding provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union the dualism of integration and intergovernmentalism becomes obvious. According to article 43(1) TEU the “CSDP shall be an integral part of CFSP”. But “the performance of tasks” (peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security) in the framework of this common policy “shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the member states” (Art. 42(1) TEU). Furthermore, the CSDP “shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” (Art. 42(2) TEU). Even though it cannot be understood as an automatism, the treaty states that “this will lead to a common defence”, however under the condition that “the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides” (Art. 42(2) TEU). The latter article also pays tribute to “the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states” and ensures that CSDP shall not cause a respective prejudice. The most explicit example of how member states keep control over the CSDP is Article 42(4) emphasizing that “decisions relating to the CSDP ... shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously”.

Recalling the need to clarify whether groups will be formed and act inside or outside the treaty framework, the Lisbon Treaty clearly embeds the option for group-building within the EU framework. Analysing the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty concerning enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation, the strengthening of the flexibility approach can be recognized. An interesting formulation can be found in Article 42(5): “The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests.” Following an overarching integrationist goal (“to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests”), a group of states might take over responsibility. The creation of such a group shall not affect another form of group building, i.e. permanent structured cooperation. The latter is conceptualized as a flexible approach and “within the Union

framework” (Art. 42(6) TEU). The decision for establishing permanent structured cooperation by the Council shall be taken by qualified majority (Art. 46(2) TEU). The protocol (No. 10) concerning permanent structured cooperation calls upon the member states to improve and harmonise their defence capabilities. This could be interpreted as an attempt to increase integration in the field of security and defence policy, but probably such a dynamic will depend on concrete steps by the member states. It will be interesting to observe whether the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will take up an important role in managing flexibility together with member states (Art. 44 and Art. 46), can channel particular national interests in a common direction.

As in earlier reform phases a recurrent question remains to be answered: what will be the effect of the new treaty? For those who are expecting the reconciliation of deepening and widening the Lisbon Treaty is probably not offering the optimal solution. CFSP and CSDP will remain policy fields causing controversial debates with regard to the degree to which they can be labelled ‘common’. Even though the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union are legally on an equal level and even though the old pillar structure will finally be overcome, the difference between the Community part and the CFSP/CSDP part can still be recognized. Foreign, security and defence policy will remain under the control of member states and intergovernmentalism will stay prominent. For the participating states it was and will be no easy task to concretely move towards the sharing of sovereignty with other states in these policy fields. Enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation offer an opportunity for more flexibility, however, it will be decisive to see under which circumstances and with which commitment EU member states will use it. What will happen if states do not use permanent structured cooperation?

Against the background of the Irish referendum, a Europe of a different integration density is becoming ever more probable. If a group inside the Union is in general willing to move ahead and if this group is using flexibility instruments like permanent structured cooperation, it will be even more interesting to observe whether a kind of core group for European foreign, security and defence policy will become reality. Such a development would have far reaching effects on the future course of the European integration process as a whole. A new understanding would be necessary with regard to the terms ‘Union’ and ‘common’. And consequently, the debate about

the EU as a global security actor, being able to shape the behaviour of other actors, would need to be re-evaluated.

Two main arguments can be used to explain why flexibility is considered to create an added value. First, it offers a possibility to overcome a standstill and/or weakening of the EU as an actor. Second, it meets the demands of member states willing to move ahead. As a consequence, different forms of differentiation characterise the European integration process.⁶⁾ It is crucial to clarify where flexibility is applied, i.e. inside the treaty framework or outside the treaty framework? The latter option would cause a serious challenge to keeping up with the approach of developing common policies. A further question that needs to be tackled is whether flexibility is an inclusive or exclusive concept. Taking a look at the development of the European integration, elements of flexibility can be found (e.g. the Schengen Agreement, the Prüm Treaty, the Euro).

III. The end of illusions

Illusion 1

It is illusionary to believe that there is an inherent logic of the integration process which implies that there will be a Political Union including a Common Foreign and Security Policy worth the term 'common'. The same applies for the Common Security and Defence Policy.

From the early days of European Political Cooperation in the 1970s until today, the building up of common instruments and the sharing of responsibilities for the conduct of foreign and security policy was and still is mainly a reactive process. Unlike the US, the EU's member states so far have not expressed clearly how they would like to commonly shape a still missing international order in the early 21st century. The European Security Strategy is just a first step. In this form it remains, however, broad and lacks a clear cut and unambiguous language.

⁶⁾ Janis Emmanouilidis distinguishes six different forms of differentiation. See Janis A. Emmanouilidis: Conceptualizing a Differentiated Europe. ELIAMEP Policy Paper No 10, June 2008, Athens.

Illusion 2

To believe that the Treaty of Lisbon would have been the long awaited reform package to strengthen CFSP and to develop the ESDP to a CSDP is an illusion. As in the cases of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties, also the Lisbon Treaty leaves those who expect more commonness unsatisfied. On the contrary, the intergovernmentalism in the field of foreign and security policy has been strengthened.

For example, the establishment of a quasi foreign minister of the EU should not be praised as the big breakthrough. On the contrary, the way this actor is embedded in the institutional structure of the Union and looking at his competences shows that this will be a restricted actor controlled by the member states, by the president of the European Council and also by the European Commission.

Many of the foreign, security and defence political provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon could be realized even without the Treaty. But, also in this case, it remains a project clearly controlled by member states.

Illusion 3

Even though, we can witness a step-by-step improvement of the EU's security and defence political capabilities, it would be an illusion to believe that the famous "capabilities-expectations gap" (Chris Hill) is getting smaller. On the contrary, by pushing the goals of CFSP/CSDP permanently higher and, at the same time, being unable to develop the needed capabilities and decision-making tools, the credibility of European foreign policy will permanently be questioned from within the Union as well as from outside.

Illusion 4

As many examples show, EU membership offers a lot of opportunities for a state to improve and strengthen its role in shaping international relations. However, it would be an illusion to expect that the member states as international actors would become equal. This is a Union of unequal member states – it always was, is and will remain like that. Being unequal finds its expression, for example, not only in terms of the capabilities member states have developed. It is even more a matter of unequal perceptions concerning the role the EU should play as a security and defence political actor on a global scale.

To conclude: Like in the past, the development of a CFSP/(C)ESDP will be
a) determined by the interests of member states;
b) influenced by threats from outside the Union.

It will depend on the intensity of the threats the Union is facing. In 2005, in a short essay in the journal *Foreign Policy* Stephen Krasner developed a scenario of mega-terrorism and how this would affect the organisation of international relations. In this context he argued that “a consortium of major powers would assume executive authority”.⁷⁾

Without being a supporter of worst case scenarios, one aspect should be considered in a pragmatic and realistic way: the EU needs to be more clear about the principle of “effective multilateralism” and consequently the options for comprehensive global engagement should be developed equally strong. This is important to develop a preventive foreign policy that is capable of handling all kinds of challenges, be it terrorism, environmental damage, mass migration, pandemics and demography as well as to manage the rise of new world powers. These challenges are gaining an increasing influence on states, as well as the EU, forcing them to adapt and reconsider long-standing patterns of conducting foreign policy.

The EU has not to reinvent its foreign, security and defence political approach. But it should develop policies that are free of illusions and also accepting that the term “integration” has to be seen in a different light. Is there really a need for an external shock to work as an internal federator?

⁷⁾ Stephen D. Krasner: The day after, in: *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2005.

Future of ESDP – A changing framework for future military officers training

by Johann Frank

Today's central conundrum for defence planners is to optimise our force postures for the challenges we see or anticipate whilst at the same time building up adaptiveness for those we cannot. (Stephan Spiegelaire)

Introductory remarks

Europe's strategic environment at the beginning of the 21st century is characterized by what experts call 'deep uncertainty'. We are living in times of dramatic international change. With regard to European security and defence policy we have to admit that it is hard to predict the functional character as well as the geographical scope of EU's security and defence policy in 20 years from now on. Strategic uncertainty has become the only "certain assumption". In the past analysts and politicians have often misread the strategic environment. Neither the fall of the Soviet Union, nor the re-emergence of real wars on the European continent or the eruption of jihad Islamism were anticipated. And every time the capabilities we had invested in proved inadequate for the new challenges. Today's basic strategic assumption is that the future will be even more unpredictable than the past. "Deep uncertainty" is the real challenge of modern security policy.¹⁾

How should Europe react to strategic uncertainty? By developing different scenarios for the future of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) this article tries to deal with the phenomenon of uncertainty and draws some conclusions for future military officers training.

The essence of strategic thinking is to shape the future by deciding between different anticipated futures: The more dynamic the international environment and the international order, the more challenging strategic decision-making on all levels.

With the end of the bipolar system, the chances for Europe to shape and influence the future landscape of international relations were enhanced

¹⁾ See Mintzberg, Henry: The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, Great Britain, 1994.

significantly. On the other hand, the decreased predictability of the international situation has reduced the possibility to anticipate future developments and therefore to plan strategically. Strategic uncertainty and difficulties in strategic forecasting are imminent to the current situation.²⁾ Fundamental changes in the conduct both of European as well as national foreign and security policy result from this evolving situation and it is difficult to predict, how it will play out in the future.

Strategic uncertainty affects the evolving process of ESDP itself. In times of dramatic international change it is hard to predict the long-term functional and geographical scope of EU's security and defence policy. Hence, it is hard to foresee how the ESDP will evolve, what functional and operational design will be given to her by the member states, how/if national and common European strategic planning will supplement or compete with each other. How will relations with US and NATO develop? How integrated and competitive will Europe's defence industry be in about 20 years from now? And to what extent ESDP can rely on European defence integration to maintain its position via strong emerging high-tech industries in transformative economies (China, India)? It is obvious that these political-strategic developments will frame the future training and education requirements.

EU is at the same time an object and subject of the international political system: EU shapes the future of the international order and is being shaped by international developments. EU's ambition is to become a global actor, which bears its responsibility for international peace and security. The military message from the European Security Strategy adopted by the Heads of States and Government in 2003 is³⁾:

- ESDP must be global and there are no principal geographical limitations;
- Europe's foreign and security policy must be framed within a multilateral context; with the consequence that European military must be able to operate together with the NATO, UN, African Union and other potential partners;
- the comparative advantage of EU's security dimension lies in its civilian and military instruments; a civil-military approach is essential and has to be further developed in all functional areas and on all levels.

²⁾ See Reiter, Erich: Perspektiven der globalen strategischen Entwicklung. Das Ende der Ordnung von Jalta, Hamburg, 2003, S. 36-39.

³⁾ Colement, Joe: Military Level of Ambition, in: Egmont Papers, (not yet published).

There is no alternative to this ambition, if the Europeans want to avoid any further loss of international influence.

For Europe the most favourable international order is a system of “cooperative multipolarity” where the essential powers look for cooperative solutions to global problems and avoid confrontative and unilateral policies. The next 20 years will show if Europe is able and willing to bundle its resources and seize the existing “window of opportunity” to contribute to a cooperative and stable international order.

But reasonable planning and strategic forecasts should not be limited by the political consensus, normative or ideological constraints. It has to take all possible and more or less plausible developments into account. Strategic planning must not exclusively be based on best case assumptions.

Geopolitical developments

Before describing the ESDP development and possible scenarios, an overview of the changing geopolitical context is given. We can identify five basic ‘known’ and therefore relative certain trends.

Globalisation is the overriding meta-trend with far reaching effects on the geopolitical situation. The three main geopolitical consequences of the ongoing globalisation process are the enormous transfer of wealth from US and Europe to Asia, the increasing competition for scarce resources and the emergence of new strategic actors. The rise of Asia will have a significant impact on geopolitics and Europe’s role in the world. A multipolar world with at least three power centres is emerging: the United States of America, the European Union and China. As Asia is becoming the new centre of gravity of the world, Europe is no longer the focus of US foreign policy. Europe will have to deal with its security and defence problems on its own and can rely less and less on American power.

Second, a zone of instability stretching from Central America to the Sahel, the greater Middle East, the ‘Stans’ and the South East Asian archipelagos is threatening the security interests of all major powers. The 2003 European Security Strategy stated that “Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict corrode states from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of state institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best known recent examples. State failure is an alarming phenomenon

that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.”⁴⁾ The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the scarcity of resources like clean water or useable land contributes to this problem.

‘Black holes’ or ungoverned territories which exist in a number of failed and weak states form a security challenge as well.⁵⁾ Terrorist organizations might use these black holes as sanctuaries and training grounds.

The European Union is depend on this region where the world’s largest oil reserves can be found. Vital oil and gas pipelines and main shipping routes run through this zone of instability.

Third the supply of energy is increasingly influencing the security agenda. With the economic boom of China and India we see a rising demand of energy sources. Since 2003 the supply of hydrocarbons has had great difficulty of meeting demand. Tight oil markets and high prices are obvious results. The Golden Age of cheap energy has passed. European Union’s economic performance is significantly affected by this development.

As energy security is a key objective of foreign and security policy of all major power, it is already increasingly difficult to reach consensus in the UN Security Council on resolutions aimed at problem states which are at the same time important suppliers of China’s or other member’s energy needs. This is illustrated by the cases like Iran, Sudan, Nigeria or Angola. With Russia becoming the world’s leading producer of oil and gas in 2004 and its “new political assertiveness” we see a further strategic consequence of energy policy.

A fourth defining issue is the enduring problem of violation of humanitarian values and the need for relieving human suffering.

Last but not least climate change might pose the most serious challenge to international peace and stability. “The impacts of climate change, particularly the growing risk of natural disasters and the damaging effects on development for already fragile states, may increase the pressure for military forces to participate in growing numbers of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and evacuation operations.”⁶⁾

⁴⁾ EU Security Strategy, p.3.

⁵⁾ R. Korteweg and D. Ehrhardt, *Terrorist Black Holes* (The Hague: Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies) 2005.

⁶⁾ The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, Third Edition, January 2007, p.29.

These challenges have important implications for shaping Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It is no coincidence that despite the EU's constitutional crisis, both CFSP and ESDP are relatively successful.

Status quo of ESDP

In the 10 years following the 1998 Franco-British Saint Malo Summit, ESDP has made considerable progress and is often qualified as a "success story". The main achievements were the creation of new institutions in Brussels, the conduct of 20 military and civilian operations on three continents and the development of common European strategic thinking and planning. The major challenge is to make real progress in capability development and to generate political will to implement common developed concepts.

The European Security Strategy acknowledges that the central security challenge for the EU is not territorial defence but international crisis management. The European security strategy provides a framework for applying military as well as civil assets to achieve certain goals. The "ESS-tasks" were added to the "Petersberg-tasks". They include measures against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stabilization of failed or failing states or the struggle against terrorism and organized crime. However, the role of the military apparatus within those policy-tasks has to be specified. So today ESDP includes – at least in theory – the whole range of military measures to maintain international peace and stability, but is constrained by the limited capacities as well as the limited political will to use them. Security policy will become more important for European politics till 2025 and will probably be dominated by rather objective factual constraints and risks rather than national quests for prestige and self interests. A recent report of the EU Institute for Security Studies predicts a more "turbulent neighbourhood" for the EU in 2025: "The EU is surrounded by regions with a high potential for problems and tensions. In many countries in these regions, long-term trends are far from promising. In 2025, the full impact of most of these trends will not have been felt but, by then, the political, economic, and security outlook at the borders of the Union is likely to have deteriorated considerably, even if catastrophic shocks (new epidemics, natural disasters, major wars) do not occur."⁷⁾

⁷⁾ Gnesotto, Nicole and Grevi, Giovanni: *The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025?*, Paris, 2006, p.204.

In 1999 European leaders set at the Summit in Helsinki the goal of being able to field, by 2003, a military force of 60.000 soldiers for international crisis management. Nearly a decade later, this force remains theoretical. In January 2007 the focus of EU's force planning was shifted from quantitative to more qualitative capabilities. The "Battlegroup" concept provides multinational force packages of around 1.500 soldiers deployable within 10 days. But the capability shortfalls which have been identified in 2000 remain without significant improvements.

If the Lisbon treaty can be ratified it will lead to further improvements concerning CFSP and ESDP. For the first time the treaty offers a clause for collective defence within the framework of the Union. The most innovative aspect of the Lisbon treaty would be the introduction of "permanent structured cooperation" in the field of defence. The creation of the "structured cooperation" could create a momentum for those Member states which are willing and able to deepen their defence cooperation. Amongst others "permanent structured cooperation" covers capability development, operations, training, logistics and joint acquisitions.

"Effective Permanent Structured Cooperation will lead to less fragmentation and duplication of defence efforts and to economies of scale (spend better together ...), encouraging pooling and sharing of capabilities. A key factor to success will be to what extent participating Member States are willing to adjust their way of thinking with regard to national defence planning. Evidently, efforts in this field will have to be spread out in the short, medium and long term. Permanent Structured Cooperation should take into account the broader framework of 'security-defence', taking into account the civil-military approach to crises and notably the role of the European Commission to that end. This global and multidisciplinary approach implies that we look at capability development from a 'dual' perspective."⁸⁾

The so-called "solidarity clause" shall guarantee support between the Member states in cases of terrorist attacks or disasters. Domestic security cooperation within the EU framework will become more important in the future and supplement deployments abroad.

⁸⁾ Hougardy, Pierre: Permanent Structured Cooperation, in: Biscop, Sven and Algieri, Franco (Eds.): The Lisbon Treaty and ESDP: Transformation and Integration, Egmont Paper 24, June, 2008, p.12.

Realistically large states will rather abstain from specialization, while small states, which will find it difficult to provide a full-spectrum force on the operational level, might rather seek to fill attractive niches. Large states will generally refrain from integrating their functioning armies into general common military structures (common army, navy etc.) as long as the contributions of other states to this pools are insignificant.

Estimations conclude that in the year 2025 European land-, air- and naval-forces will be highly interoperable, not only when deployed but also concerning equipment and training. This will contribute to a common pool of interoperable and effective forces with common support and C² structures and thereby fostering a common spirit and confidence in European common action.

In 2025 European military forces might play a leading role in confronting risks and threats to international peace and security. European states might field the largest quantities of deployed soldiers in all kinds of international missions. EU engagement will be vital to the success or failure of the early 21st century world order and international stability.

It is uncertain that the all Union's member states will be represented in ESDP on equal terms. Rather their political influence will be proportional to the efforts they make in terms of military contribution and operational deployment.

Operational success of military missions will increasingly depend on the mission's integration into comprehensive political efforts.

Success and effectiveness of international crisis management operations is becoming more and more depend on a comprehensive approach, which encompasses all necessary military and civilian instruments.

Despite all the achievements ESDP many observers agree that far reaching innovations and improvements are needed, if we want to avoid that ESDP becomes a "Paper Tiger".


Nick Witney, the first Director of the European Defence Agency, analyses:

"Yet EU members have done too little to modernise their militaries. Nearly two decades after the end of the Cold War, most European armies are still geared towards all-out warfare on the inner-German border rather than keeping the peace in Chad, or supporting security and development in Afghanistan. European defence resources still pay for a total of 10.000 tanks, 2.500

combat aircraft, and nearly two million men and women in uniform – more than half a million more than the US hyper power. Yet 70% of Europe's land forces are simply unable to operate outside national territory – and transport aircraft, communications, surveillance drones and helicopters (not to mention policemen and experts in civil administration) remain in chronically short supply. This failure to modernise means that much of the € 200 billion that Europe spends on defence each year is simply wasted.”⁹⁾

His proposal for the way forward is the establishment of a “Pioneer”-Model. Others (Charles Grant et al.) conclude that if 10 percent of the existing defence budgets were earmarked and spent for European projects and capabilities the EU would be able to field 60.000 soldiers for the whole spectrum of international crisis-management.

EU Scenario's



Graphic 1: EU Scenario's

Depending on the peculiarities and evolvement of the driving factors (graphic 1: political problems, level of nationalization of security policy, USA/NATO-relations, role of the EU as an actor, periphery integration, defence integration and economic development) the Centre for Applied Politics in Munich has developed five different scenarios. Each scenario has different implications for the development of ESDP and European defence structures.

⁹⁾ Witney, Nick: Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, July, 2008, p.1.

Titanic¹⁰⁾

This is the worst-case scenario of the possible paths of integrative developments. Reasons for a renationalization of the security and defence sector will most probably be hazardous enlargement without the necessary institutional reforms, diverging interests of its member states combined with political insecurity through weak economic performances and internal crisis. The Union will be unable to develop into a real actor on the international scene, coalitions outside the EU framework will grow, the US and NATO influence on European security and defence policy will be high. Transformation process of European armies will come to an halt.

Prolonging the status quo

In this scenario the integration process will continue on the same terms as in the previous decades. The Unions role will be limited geographically to certain areas and operationally to rather supplementary tasks. Neighbourhood policy will be the primary concern for the Union. The large state's interests will be shaping the Union's actions and decisions. Neither will current European competences be reallocated at national level, nor will the Union's competences and tools increase beyond current levels. In this scenario the US will stay the leading power of the West.

Core Europe

No common vision for the Union's structure and future political role is agreed by 27 (or more) member states. In this scenario a stable group of like-minded member states with similar interests in most policy areas will cooperate together on a permanent basis. They might do so in an institutionalized framework outside of the EU's institutions. The political role of the union itself is barely enhanced with this development, as the coalition scores the reputation on the international scene, not the EU as such.

¹⁰⁾ Algieri, Franco/Emmanouilidis, Janis A./Maruhn, Roman: Europa differenziert denken – Fünf Szenarien zur Zukunft der Europäischen Union, in: Reiter, Erich (Hg.) Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2003, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Berlin, Bonn 2003, S. 198-211.

Multispeed Europe: Open coalitions within the EU

In difference to the scenario above the member states willing to proceed will do so within the (modified) framework of the EU, which gives them the possibility to proceed with different projects, groups, and initiatives with different Partners (big and small, “old and new” Europe etc.). Previously defined criteria’s will be decisive for a member state’s application to one of these groups. If they fulfil them, they might join.


European Superpower: United States of Europe

The EU is becoming a coherent political actor. All important policy-areas are supranationally governed by European institutions and the whole potential of Europe as such is available for the Union’s foreign policy actions. The US is losing their position as a “hegemon” in Europe.


As the development of the ESDP dependent on the EU’s overall political and economic performance and integrative power, several different “futures” for the ESDP and their institutional framework may be derived.

ESDP Scenario’s

The starting point in developing ESDP scenario’s is a comprehensive situation analysis, which figures out all relevant factors with significant impact on the future evolvement of ESDP. Graphic 2 shows the most important factors in a logical order.

**Graphic 2: ESDP Scenario's**

The next step in the analysis process is to define the relationship between the factors. How do the factors relate to each other? The factors are linked with arrows. Blue arrows show relationships that reinforce the target factor, whereas red factors indicate impacts that counterbalance or mitigate the target factor. The strength rating (from -10 to +10) correlates with the width of the arrow (see Graph 3 below).



Graphic 3: Defining relationships

According to the score of ingoing and outgoing arrows the key (=driving) factors can be identified. Key factors tend to be both active (cause change) and passive (are subject to change).

In our model the key driving factors of ESDP are:

- **Global strategic environment**
- **Political integration success**
- **EU-USA relations**
- **Economic development**
- Political coherence
- Political leadership (Big 3)
- Defence Expenditures
- **Integration of defence industry**

- Success of ongoing military transformation process – „**real capacity development**“
- Success of ongoing missions

Each of these factors can have alternate development options.

Global-strategic development 13	Political integration Process 17	EU-US relations 9	EU Profile 13	Political leadership 35	Economic development 11	Defence Expenditures 1	ESDP Profile 1	Defence Industry 1
US predominance 50	Continuation of Status quo 75	Equal partner 33	autonomous global actor 30	high - driven by common European 29	high growth rates (+3%) 40	Status Quo 1,8 Prozent 43	Strategic approach 26	European 26
Cooperative Multipolarity 25	Ever closer union (United States of 6	Junior partner 33	regional actor 60	high - but driven by national 29	moderate growth 40	cuts 43	civ-mil profile 47	partly supranational 47
Confrontative Multipolarity 15	Re-Nationalisation 19	Transatlantic Disconnection 33	no profile 10	low 43	recession 20	More efficient use 13	regional stabilisation profile 26	national 26
Non-polar world 10								

Graphic 4: ESDP Option Development

Graph 4 shows the alternate options for the key ESDP-drivers from more status quo oriented and conservative assumptions to more different options. For example the “global strategic environment” can vary between “US predominance” – “Cooperative Multipolarity (with different centres of power; most probably US, China and EU)” – “Confrontative Multipolarity (with tensions and open rivalries between the poles)” – “Non-polar world (with a diffuse rather than a concentrated distribution of power and a strong role of non-state actors¹¹⁾”. The description of the alternate options for the key drivers has to be based upon a comprehensive study and literature review. A detailed explanation of each option would go beyond the scope of this article.¹²⁾

The next step in the analysis process is to answer the “consistency question”: “How does each alternative coexist” with alternatives in each of the other key driver. Consistency measures the logical fit of two alternatives: the higher the consistency (+3 to –3) the better the coexistence of the two alternatives. A predominant role of the US in the world for example fits very well with the status quo of the European integration process but less with an “United European State”.

¹¹⁾ See Haass, Richard, Non-polar World, in: Foreign Affairs, May/June 2008, p.44-57.

¹²⁾ For a more detailed analysis see: Frank, Johann: Perspektiven der europäischen militärischen Integration. Entwicklungsszenarien und Konsequenzen für Österreich, Wien, 2008.

Possible ESDP scenarios are derived from consistent combinations of the optional developments of the key drivers. In general we can distinguish five different ESDP scenarios:

- o Scenario „Europower“
- o Scenario „Equal partner within NATO“
- o Scenario „Junior partner combined with civil-military Soft-Power-Profile“
- o Scenario „Paper-Tiger“
- o Scenario „Re-Nationalisation“

Although each of the scenario is possible and can not completely be ruled out, the scenarios differ with regard to the development of the underlying driving factors and they are characterised by different probabilities and plausibilities. From today's perspective the author assesses the “Junior partner-Model” or some form of “Core Europe” as the more probable scenarios.

Europower

In this scenario ESDP is the primary institutional framework for managing European security and defence issues. ESDP provides the instruments for EU's global strategic influence. The European security dimension is covering all vital European interests and guarantees an autonomous ability to deal with the whole spectrum of military tasks including strategic coercion and territorial defence independent from US support. Political integration progress and success provides the framework for an “evolutionary path” to a single “European Army”. This model might gradually evolve from an avant-garde group with other nations joining at a latter stage of the process.

Strategic preconditions for this scenario with regard to the identified driving factors:

- Confrontative global strategic environment;
- US policy neglecting NATO;
- Military, economic and morale US overstretch;
- Strong political cohesion within the EU;
- Strong political leadership of the Big-3;
- Policy change in UK;

- No disaggregation policy of US vis a vis the European integration project;
- At least moderate increase of defence expenditures and much better ways of spending;
- Strong and integrated European defence industry;
- Successful force transformation processes producing interlocked network-centric armies as a first step accompanied by gradual pooling of capabilities and common procurement of strategic assets.

Equal partner within NATO

This scenario sees a common and shared responsibility of ESDP and NATO for European security and defence issues. ESDP is able to provide comprehensive capabilities for the whole spectrum of crisis management with a special focus on civil-military operations. On the global arena EU relies on US.

Strategic preconditions for this scenario with regard to the identified driving factors:

- Confrontative global strategic environment;
- A renewed transatlantic partnership;
- US leadership and acceptance of an equal European “caucus” within NATO;
- Political cohesion within the EU;
- Moderate to high economic growth;
- Inner-European balance between “old” and “new” Europeans;
- At least moderate increase of defence expenditures and much better ways of spending;
- Strong and integrated European defence industry;
- Successful force transformation processes which allows military more able European countries to fight alongside with the US.

Junior partner with a special civil-military soft-power profile

This scenario is characterised by the dominance of NATO. The Alliance is the primary institution for organising European security and defence. NATO provides the framework for different forms of “coalitions of the willing”.

ESDP has some capabilities for international crisis management, but limited resources and political will to conduct more demanding military operations. There is a broad consensus amongst the Europeans that their added value to international peace and security is the “comprehensive approach” and the often indirect application of soft power. In the long run this approach leads to a task and role sharing between the US and EU, whereby NATO and US-led coalitions of the willing are focusing on expeditionary warfare and the EU is concentrating its ambition on stabilisation and reconstruction operations with limited political influence on the European side.

Strategic preconditions for this scenario with regard to the identified driving factors:

- Global US predominance or a more cooperative international order;
- Low economic growth rates;
- Common transatlantic threat perception;
- Political leadership of US within NATO;
- Moderate political cohesion within the EU;
- Adequate political leadership of the Big-3;
- Enduring special relationship between UK (other Europeans) and US;
- Stagnation of defence expenditures;
- Some common European procurement projects;
- Different ways of national force transformation with the bulk of EU countries focusing on stabilisation and reconstruction profiles.

Re-Nationalisation

The political integration process losses its dynamic and the support by the European population. Lip-service is not back by substance and political will to implement common decisions. The profile of ESDP covers low-risk peace-keeping operations on the European periphery. All efforts to re-vitalise the Lisbon Treaty have failed, leaving the EU with an insufficient legal and institutional framework. Enlargement has led to an political overstretch. European economy is weak and suffering from unresolved social problems (ageing population). Frustrated by internal obstruction policies some countries try to establish new forms of defence cooperation outside the EU and form a coalition of the willing. This group of more ambitious countries manage to develop sufficient capabilities to conduct medium

seize operations on their own. EU has no political control over these extra-institutional developments.

Strategic preconditions for this scenario with regard to the identified driving factors:

- Confrontative global strategic environment or US dominance;
- Low economic growth rates, ageing population, social problems, migration challenge;
- Common transatlantic threat perception;
- Stagnation of the European integration process;
- Weak European institutions – stronger role of nation states;
- Close Franco-British defence cooperation;
- Loss of ambition that EU must be a global actor;
- Decreasing defence budgets;
- No integration of European defence industry;
- Stop of force transformation process in many EU countries.

Combination of EU-ESDP-Interest-Mission Profile

<i>EU-Scenario</i>	<i>ESDP-Szenario</i>	<i>Supported Interests</i>	<i>Functional Profile</i>	<i>Geographical Scope^{*)}</i>
<i>Titanic</i>	Re-Nationalisation	General Interests: Human Security, Humanitarian Relief	Low intensity crisis management operations	➤ Balkans ➤ Global: humanitarian operations
<i>Status quo</i>	Juniorpartner and soft-power actor	General und Essential Interests: Stabilisation of arc of instability (not autonomous)	Low and medium risk crisis management operations	➤ ENP ➤ Subsahra-Africa
<i>Core Europe</i>	Equal-partner	General Interests and Essentiell Interests and Vital Interests (only partial)	Full spectrum but limited by available and useable military resources	➤ Central Asia ➤ Caucasus ➤ Middle East ➤ Africa
United States of Europe	Europower	All levels of interests are covered	Full spectrum	➤ Global

^{*)} in addition to the above mentioned

Conclusions for future training and education of military officers

By 2020 there might be a greater integration between European armed forces. Rather than one single „European Army“ we will more probably see a network of interlocking „European armies“ with supranational elements and with individual countries specialising in certain skills. The force mix will consist of:

- jointly owned and run equipment esp. strategic assets (transport, reconnaissance, communications);
- role and task sharing elements;
- multinational force packages.

The profile of European soldier will change and include more women, ethnic minorities, scientists or technology experts.

The new tasks will require a broad spectrum of skills: „warriors“-“peace-keepers“-“police-type forces“. Civil-military tasks will further expand and require judges, engineers, bankers, development advisers, disaster relief experts etc. In principal there are two options for providing these personal. Either the civilian agencies and ministries improve their capabilities or the military will have to provide them – at least on a temporarily basis.

Questions for further elaboration during the symposium

- What are the consequences of “strategic uncertainty” for military training and education?
- What education strategy for EU against the background of the ambiguities in the political integration process?
 - o Pragmatic bottom-up approach (Module-System, Centres of excellence)
 - o Strategic driven top-down approach
 - o What are the advantages and risks of each approach?
- Training is an element of „Capacity building“. But which capabilities does and will ESDP realistically need in the future?
- What are the political preconditions for a more efficient task and role sharing in the field of training and education?
- Which types of task sharing between EU and national level?
- What is the meaning of subsidiarity in the field of training?

- How to deal with the broad spectrum of military tasks?
- If „civ-mil“ cooperation is the central feature – what are the implications for civilian and military training programmes?
- How to balance training requirements for new Homeland Security tasks, international crisis-management operations and traditional territorial defence?
- Should we prepare for full-spectrum mission planning or specialisation?
- How to translate adaptive planning into training and education concepts?
- How will the attitudes of “generation Y” (anti-bureaucratic, hyper critical towards power, more open-minded vis a vis different cultures etc.) effect military education?

Education and training is an essential part of “capability development” within ESDP, where likeminded and smaller countries can make an invaluable contribution. The existing “window of opportunity” should be seized by developing new and innovative concepts.

Status and Perspectives of Training and Education within the EUs concept

by Jochen Rehr

“United in diversity” is the motto of the European Union. This motto also applies for the education and training area of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Diversity is up to 100% achieved. But unity is still lacking because up to now the training area resembles more a mosaic.

The EU organises a huge number of courses, conferences and seminars, all with the goal to deepen a common European security culture. An even bigger number of various trainings are offered by the EU member states and their training facilities. But the conceptual documents, namely the “EU Training Policy in ESDP” (doc. 14176/2/03) and the “EU Training Concept in ESDP” (doc. 11970/04) are outdated and should be renewed better sooner than later.

“Training lies within the responsibility of the member states”. This ‘agreed language’ within the EU Member States stamps the ESDP training. Training at EU level should be offered only if it works complementary to national efforts. Therefore, it is also not surprising that there is only one single EU training institution which deals exclusively with ESDP training, namely the European Security and Defence College (ESDC).

The European Security and Defence College (ESDC)

The ESDC was founded in 2005. It is established virtually with the consequence that one looks in vain for a building and professors. But it exists. The college consists of a network based on contributions of various national education and training facilities, ranging from universities to schools, from national defence academies to peace research institutes. The aim unites the actors. At the end “A Secure Europe in a Better World” should be established and the ESDC should make its contribution to reach this ambitious goal.

The only permanent committee in the ESDC is the secretariat. Currently this body accommodates two full time members of the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and two seconded national experts. However, if necessary, the secretariat can fall back on the expertise of other colleagues employed in the GSC. The secretariat supports both meeting formats of the

college; on the one hand the Steering Committee (SC) which consists of political representatives of all EU member states, and on the other hand the Executive Academic Board (EAB), which comprises experts of European training facilities as members. The Steering Committee should give the politico-strategic guidance to the ESDC. The committee is supported by the Executive Academic Board with advices and recommendations.

The College, supported by numerous national training actors, offers currently a “High Level Course – HLC”, up to five “Orientation Courses – OC” and other training activities per year. The High Level Course focuses on the strategic leadership level and provides the necessary ESDP-background knowledge within five modules. The Orientation Courses were developed primarily for “ESDP-newcomers” to equip them with a sound ESDP knowledge. The other training activities concern the specialised training which shows either a horizontal or a geographic ESDP focus. Within this category of ESDC training courses one may find, e.g., a course for press and public information officers (PPI), a course with an African focus or a course “ESDP and gender issues”.

The European Commission (EC)

The European Commission (EC), which basically does not interfere in matters with defensive implications, also offers courses which were not developed primarily for ESDP operations and missions. However, the courses mirror the same subjects as in ESDP training. The EC project to develop civilian crisis management tools is based on cooperation between the commission and national institutes and universities. Together they try to build up crisis management capabilities especially in the civilian area. The offered abilities and competences include the areas of human rights, rule of law and civil administration. The cooperation looks in such a way that the commission calls for tenders to conduct a course, selects the best from the applicants and contributes about 40% of the total expenses. The national institutes have organised themselves in an informal training group (EGT – European Group on training). Already in advance this group starts to co-ordinate and try to identify that institute which is best qualified.

The European Defence Agency (EDA)

The European Defence Agency (EDA) is at European level probably the latest actor who starts to deal with training. Primary task of the agency is to identify and help to develop capabilities for military crisis management operations. And the agency interprets the term “capability” in a very broad sense. Hence the development of capability of personnel is also seen as part of its tasks. The courses provided by the EDA are also conducted in cooperation with national and EU institutions (among others the EU satellite centre in Torrejón) especially in the technological area of intelligence gathering (e.g.; OSINT, HUMINT). The member states are contented and ask for more courses and also for more course places. Exactly this fact poses a basic problem. Training is no prior task of the agency. Therefore, the EDA tries - currently still behind the curtain - to hand over the successful courses and conferences to another institution. And the European Security and Defence College could play a role. But a main problem still has to be solved: these courses cost money. The EDA has in the short run an own budget line. However, the ESDC has no budget at all.

The General Council Secretariat (GCS)

Besides the ESDC, the EDA and the European Commission you will also find the Council Secretariat dealing with ESDP training. This training is more on an ad-hoc basis, but nevertheless very useful and cost efficient. Legal Advisers, Special Representatives or civilian experts receive mission tailored training. A more structured approach is established in the field of ATHENA, the financing mechanism for military ESDP operations.

The European Diplomatic Programme (EDP)

Additionally, training is provided within the European Diplomatic Programme (EDP). The target audience for this ESDP related training are young diplomats from EU Member States. The programme tries to evolve a European identity among diplomats, create a network and therefore share in creating a common European security culture. The EDP has also a modular structure. The main actors are the national diplomatic academies. The leading role of one EDP-term takes – besides the European Commission – the institute of the EU member state which also presides the Council. If the Treaty of Lisbon enters into force and the External Action Service (EAS) will start to exist, the EDP could grow up to a sort of European Diplomatic Academy.

The EU Member States (EU-MS)

The EU member states have a broadly diversified training and education network which is more or less co-ordinated and offers also more or less training with ESDP contents in their programmes. In this regard, the smaller EU-MS face the biggest challenges. It is hard for them to have their personnel properly trained in ESDP issues. They host only a few to none training providers offering again a little to none ESDP training in their curricula. The larger EU states have a huge number of academies, universities and institutes who deal with ESDP. Sometimes they conduct even specific ESDP courses. Therefore it is not surprising, that the smaller countries favour a more EU centred approach in training.

Even if there is some sort of ESDP training, the guidelines and overviews within the EU are lacking. Because of this fragmentation it may also not surprise if duplication exists, quality management lacks and less profound trainers deliver wrong facts about the ESDP. For example, an “ESDP expert” from a southern EU member state who lectures on many occasions the subject “The role of the EU in the world” stated that there is a division of labour between NATO and the EU and this was also formalized by the Berlin plus agreement. “Absolute nonsense”, would announce anybody confident with ESDP. But taking a “ESDP-newcomer” as an example, receiving this information by an “expert” could probably contribute to confusion. Probably this example shows why there is so much lack of knowledge, misconceptions and misunderstandings when ESDP is concerned. No clear guidelines, no coherence and nearly no quality control are the main weaknesses of ESDP and ESDP related training.

But the task to introduce a quality control mechanism in ESDP training is also not easy to implement. Why? Because it is a sensible issue. Honestly, who wants to be evaluated from someone else and at the end of the day maybe declared as incompetent? Moreover, such coordination is not easy to manage because the training providers are only partly governmental institutions. Most actors are organised as non-governmental organisations (NGO), so to say under private law with very limited governmental influence. The coordination within such an intergovernmental environment may be difficult, probably impossible. And who would put the standards? Brussels? The EU capitals? And which sanctions would one intend?

Regarding quality control, the ESDC is one step ahead. Since two years, all courses with an ESDC logo are evaluated. This evaluation is based on the

model of Donald L. Kirkpatrick. First the participants of ESDC-training are asked how did they like the training (level 1). The second level deals with the learning success. To receive results, the course participants must complete both an entrance test and a final test. The results are finally compared. In the third level it is asked whether the provided knowledge has effects on the job in everyday's life. And the last level searches for the effects which the training has had in the long run, e.g., efficiency increase or cost reduction.

All four levels of the evaluation are carried out by the ESDC. Even the difficult 4th level was offered during the last graduate's meeting of the college and the results show that the ESDC cannot be removed from the ESDP training stage any more. For most graduates of the high level course the participation in an ESDC training activity had positive effects on their jobs.

"The fragmentation and, as a result, the lack of coherence in ESDP training manifest the biggest challenge." This statement is not new, because it was already put up to several EU reports, last in the 'Comprehensive Annual Report on ESDP and ESDP related Training (CART) 2008'. Additionally the artificial division of training in tactical, operational and strategic level do not help at all to overcome the difficulties. There is no difference whether the staffs in EU headquarters (operational level) or in ministries (strategic level) are familiar with the crisis management procedures. The training could be identical for both staffs. In this respect, the division between the various levels of ESDP training does not make any sense, hinders effective coherence and therefore should be abolished.

The EU-reform treaty (Treaty of Lisbon) offers a chance to improve the situation for ESDP and ESDP related training. In this legal document the CSDP (as ESDP will then be called after entering into force of the treaty) will be further developed. The solidarity clause, the mutual assistance clause, the permanent structured cooperation and the broadened CSDP-tasks are only few innovations in this area. The largest innovation concerning training/education could be the External Action Service (EAS) of the European Union. This service should support the actions of the High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs. The High Representative should guarantee the coherence between commission and council action. Therefore, the HR will be double headed, namely HR and vice president of the EC. The conflicts between the EC and the Council should then be overcome, also in the ESDP training area.

The EU needs a management mechanism in the field of ESDP and ESDP related training, which includes both EU and national level. And the ESDC could take over this task. Therefore, the ESDC should be equipped with all necessary resources

- to offer a sort of “training bourse” (clearing house) at EU level (drop-in centre for EU member states to be able to let train their staffs and to avoid unnecessary duplication);
- to support national training providers with expertise;
- to be able to present the training offers in a comprehensive training programme and
- to be in a position to offer a financial support and budgetary planning for ESDP training on a limited scale.

Therefore the college must overcome its virtual existence and evolve to a “living” institution, with legal personality, its own budget and last but not least a small staff on its own. Up to now a total of three CFSP agencies exist: the EU institute for security studies (EU INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION) in Paris, the EU satellite centre (EUSC) in Torrejón and the European Defence Agency (EDA) in Brussels. The ESDC should become number four.

The EU-police academy (CEPOL) in Bramshill could serve as an example how to organise such a training institute at EU level. CEPOL brings together the training efforts of all 27 EU member states and thereby guarantees an “Europeanization” of police training. In the same line the ESDC could become the focal point for ESDP and ESDP related training.

The European Union plays a unique role in the world. It is more than an international organisation but less than a state. In some areas it is organised supranational, in others intergovernmental. By its uniqueness and its mighty civil-military instruments the EU has to perceive a global responsibility. And this responsibility must be based on a sound education and training of all relevant actors. Therefore, it is a task of the EU and every single EU member state to bring into life the motto “united in diversity” also in the field of ESDP education and training.

Basic Documents

EU Training Policy in ESDP

- Doc 14176/2/03
- Approved by the Council on 17 November 2003

EU Training Concept in ESDP

- Doc 11970/04
- Approved by the Council on 13 September 2004

Basic Documents

EU Training Policy in ESDP

- Definitions and objectives
- Training Requirements
- Categories of training
- Target personnel
- Guidelines and responsibilities
- Networking
- Guidelines for the implementation of the policy

EU Training Concept in ESDP

- Objectives
- Responsibilities
- Networking
- EU Training Programme
- Implementation Process
- Training Audience
- Co-operation with IOs and other international entities
- Financing


Objectives

At strategic planning level

- Develop throughout the Union a common ESDP culture
- Provide the EU instances with knowledgeable personnel able to work efficiently on all ESDP matters
- Provide EU Member States's administrations and staffs with knowledgeable personnel, familiar with EU policies, institutions and procedures

At operational / tactical level

- Prepare civilian and military personnel to take part in EU-led operations
- Facilitate interoperability within civilian and military fields, and their co-ordination





The European Security and Defence College Role and Current Training Activities

Based on a presentation by Gustav Lindström

Overview of presentation

1. Background and role of the European Security and Defence College
2. Overview of ESDC training activities
3. Issues currently under consideration

What is the European Security and Defence College (ESDC)?

- Organised as a network between national institutes, colleges, academies, and institutions within the EU dealing with security and defence policy and the EU-ISS
- Serves as a key actor for the provision of training in the field of ESDP
- Provides ESDP training courses focusing on the strategic level

What are the origins of the ESDC?

Initiative/Stage	Event	Date
Initial proposal	Franco-German Summit	Jan. 03
Reiteration of proposal	BE/FR/GE/LU Summit	Apr. 03
Definition of principles	EU Training Policy and Concept for Training in ESDP	Nov.03 – Sept. 04
Initiation of definition of modalities	European Council	Dec. 04
Formal establishment	Council Joint Action	July 05
Further development	Council Joint Action	July 08
New ESDP Training Concept	Evaluation Report	Nov 08

What are the key objectives of the ESDC?

- To further enhance the European security culture within ESDP
- To promote a better understanding of ESDP as an essential part of CFSP
- To encourage professional contacts among training participants
- To provide Member States' administrations and staff with knowledgeable personnel familiar with EU policies, institutions, and procedures

How is the ESDC organised?

Steering Committee	Executive Academic Board	Permanent Secretariat
<u>Tasks:</u> •Provide overall coordination and direction of ESDC training activities <u>Members:</u> Member States' representatives	<u>Tasks:</u> Implement ESDC training activities Provide quality assurance and coherence <u>Members:</u> Participating institutes, colleges, academies	<u>Tasks:</u> Assist Steering Committee and EAB Support Brussels-based training activities <u>Members:</u> Council Secretariat Seconded national experts

What are the training activities of the ESDC?

Principal training activities:

- ESDP Orientation Course
- ESDP High Level Course
- ESDP PPI Course

Supplementary training tools (High Level Course):

- Internet-Based Advanced Distance Learning System
- ESDC Alumni network seminar

What is the ESDP Orientation Course?

- A week-long course that provides a broad overview of ESDP
- Typically, five to six Orientation Courses are held each academic year – usually in Brussels
- Aimed at working level civilian and military staff from EU Member States and Acceding States (in principle open to Candidate Countries and Third States)
- To date, approximately 640 participants have attended ESDP Orientation Courses

What is the ESDP High Level Course (HLC)?

- One HLC is organised per academic year
- In principle, consists of five ‘week-long’ residential modules organised in different EU Member States
- Aimed at senior civilian and military personnel from EU Member States and Acceding States dealing with ESDP-related issues
- To date, around 250 participants have gone through the ESDC High Level Course

What are some issues currently under consideration?

- ESDC as the “leading” agency in ESDP training
- Academic programme for the next academic years
- Additional types of training activities
- Procedural and organisational questions
- Practical implementation of the Internet-Based Advanced Distance Learning System
- Cooperation with non-EU entities (e.g. GCSP)

“The virtual (European) Military Academy-Model”

by Anne Rohrbach

It is now one year ago that the participants of the Symposium “Methods of making officer training more European in the course of the Bologna Process” gave themselves 3 days to think about possibilities and ways to materialize the Bologna process for the formation of officers.

There were engaged discussions and different ways to approach the subject.

There was a strong feeling for the importance of this process with a clear understanding that it means large shoes to fill.

But there were objections as well and different opinions, how and to which extent such a realization is possible and desirable.

It is now one year ago that I introduced to the participants of the aforementioned symposium a method – SYNNOVATION – which in my opinion can help to construct the frame for an intensified cooperation in order to reach the aims of the Bologna process regarding officer formation.

Today I am glad to present you a model that we have developed subsequent to the last symposium – the model of a virtual European Military Academy (VEMA) – that could be a framework for going on in the process of making the Bologna process alive.




Graphic 1: The Virtual (European) Military Academy Model

I will start my presentation with a short summary of the status quo of the Bologna process in general and the Bologna process referring to European military academies in particular.

I will then highlight conditions which are important for the process.

On that basis I want to introduce you to the model of a virtual European military academy – which in my eyes could be a starting point to make Bologna happen.

The Constitution of a European Higher Education Area



Graphic 2: The Bologna Process: Ambitious Project – Prolonged Realization

So, let us start with the basics. The vision of a European Higher Education Area was born in 1997. The declaration of Bologna, signed in 1999 by then 29 European nations has today gathered 46 nations and it has initiated significant changes in the European landscape of scientific education.

The main goal of the Bologna process was and remains

- a deepened cooperation in scientific education, making available special competences of national universities to a broader community in order to strengthen European excellence and competitiveness;
- an increased exchange of students and teachers on a European level.

This means joint curricula development and cooperation in research and development.

And it means to develop mutually agreed upon and accepted quality standards.

But what the public has got to regard as the Bologna process are the means by which these goals hopefully are to be accomplished, which are

- a unified system of comparable degrees – the Bachelor-Master-PhD-System;
- the introduction of a common system of credit points – ECTS;
- the organization of studies in a more modular way.

Thus, students can absolve at least one or more modules at another university and it is not necessary that studies at different universities need too high a degree of uniformity.

Actually, my impression is that the consequences of introducing these means and the involved changes are absorbing the view within the box, are hindering to see the forest for the trees.

In Germany, the actual discussion is mainly about checking the Bachelor-Master-System against the old diploma degrees and about comparing the assets and drawbacks of both. It is about poor implementation of the new educational organization. And it is less about the dream of an excellent European scientific education.

The Fruits of cooperation are apparent and necessary lessons
have been done

Master-Bachelor-System introduced at most military academies


- with ECTS credit point system
- and a modular organization of courses

Graphic 3: Bologna Process and Military Academies: the Status Quo (1)

Between European armies, the exchange of young officers is institutionalized in many domains, if not necessarily in the scientific one. There are joint field exercises, and students of Theresianische Militärakademie as an example absolve international practical courses during their formation. It seems logical to enlarge this cooperation to the scientific domain.

So it comes as no real surprise, that most military academies have by now introduced the bachelor-master-system with its ECTS credit point system and have organized studies in a more modular way, this being the basic precondition for the intended exchange.

... but the obstacles nevertheless remain demanding



Graphic 4: Bologna Process and Military Academies: the Status Quo (2)

But in detail and in concrete the project of increased exchange between military academies is far from realization in many aspects, as it is at civilian universities and academies.

Actually, important stumbling blocks for the cooperation of military academies are especially:

- diverging organization
- different content
- language problems

Officer formation is organized differently

In many European countries, military formation and scientific formation of officers are cross linked. Officer training courses and scientific courses alternate.

But in some countries these qualifications are separated and follow each other.

Thus, in Germany scientific qualification follows the military courses.

In Switzerland officers who want to get the status of regular officer have to begin their academic studies with the grade of a lieutenant.

In some European Countries officer formation largely takes place within the military academy. In other countries only the military education happens at the military academy whereas the scientific formation takes place at a civilian university.

While studies in most European countries are organized in semesters, studies at the German military universities are organized in trimesters.

The content of officers' scientific formation differs

In some countries the main emphasis of formation is with military contents and scientific contents as well refer to the later occupational area of being an officer (Austria, Switzerland)

In other countries studies have exclusively civilian content (Germany) so that the degree acquired at Hochschule der Bundeswehr is 100% compatible with a civilian degree.

And there is still a language problem

Even if every officer learns and masters the English language, courses in military academies of most countries are held in the local language almost exclusively. Up to now there are only few courses held in English language.

Conclusion

The formal preconditions of the Bologna Process have been created at military academies. But up to now and due to different national historical experiences and traditions officer formation remains unique in every European country. That is no formidable obstacle, however, because the constitution of a European higher education area does not mean to level differences and uniqueness. But it increases the amount of effort to be undertaken in order to combine excellences and make them available on a European level.

Territory defense has become a task of secondary importance with multiple consequences



Gaphic 5: Since the End of Cold War Goals and Structures of European national armies have converged increasingly

To begin an ambitious project like the Bologna Process, a common system of credits and a range of courses organized in a modular way are far from sufficient.

For a – partially – shared officer formation, an agreed upon self-perception and self-conception of the European militaries will be of importance as well. A common set of attitudes, beliefs and understanding of the duties and desired competences of an officer could foster a conjoint formation and make things work much easier.

So what do we know about a shared European self-conception of the military and their officers?

As I am a civilian and have therefore no direct access to this topic I have consulted the literature and found some hints for similar developments in the European military. In the following, I refer especially to Karl Haltiner & Paul Klein: *The European Post-Cold War Military Reforms and Their Impact on Civil-Military Relations*.

With the end of the Cold War the European security and military sector has undergone substantial changes.

Territory defence has become a task of secondary importance. And within the territorial defence triad: protection of territorial integrity, international crisis management, support of civil authorities in the case of unforeseen events – the ranking has changed.

As a consequence, national armies have been substantially downsized in most European countries.

There exists a similar development in nearly all European nations from 200 year old conscription based mass armies up to smaller, technologically more sophisticated, modularly and flexibly structured volunteer based professional armed forces.

Three „waves“ of reform		
• 1990 – 1995	Downsizing	Cost-motivated downsizing of personnel, weapons, equipment
• 1996 – 2001	Internationalization, professionalization (NATO)	Security strategy for the whole alliance territory International collaboration Changing competence profile for officers
• since 2001	Common foreign and security policy (EU)	Intensified military cooperation Development of flexible, modular structures

Source: HALTNER, KLEIN: The European Post-Cold War Military Reforms and Their Impact on Civil-Military Relations

Gaphic 6: Reforms have altered European armies significantly

Haltiner & Klein describe 3 waves of reform:

1. Downsizing Wave (1990 – 1995): a rapid predominantly cost-motivated downsizing of the armed forces in most European countries. Costs were scaled down by cutting back personnel, weapons and equipment. As the predominant threat had disappeared, national defence seemed no longer a task of primary importance.
2. NATO-oriented Phase of Internationalization and Professionalization (1996 – 2001): This phase was provoked by the wars of the early nineties in the gulf and in the Balkans. Concepts and strategies had to be transformed in the light of an expanded spectrum of tasks. National defence strategies lost importance in favour of a security strategy for the whole alliance territory. Conceptual and strategic transformation of the military apparatus had to be done to face an expanded spectrum of tasks and a changing competence and recruiting profile. There was an increasing international collaboration in military affairs with multinational brigades to be formed, “Partnership for Peace” established in 1994, multinational peace missions, especially in the Balkans. This also meant a changing competence profile for officers. Referring to conscription, the number of conscripts began to exceed demand; there was more and more selective conscription with the problem of unequal burden-sharing.
3. Wave of modularization and flexibilization since about 2001: Military cooperation has intensified. Europe’s decision to set up a Rapid Action Force for its common foreign and security policy demands a flexible organization structures according to the modular principle. The downsi-

zing of personnel is still continued – but it is less cost-oriented this time but more part of a goal-oriented comprehensive strategy. On the other hand there are rising costs for modern weapon systems and equipment to reach a common level.

Despite all attempts to safeguard national traditions and military cultures, the reform stages – so Haltiner and Klein – are obviously subject to the same underlying structural pressures. As a consequence, reforms not only point in the same direction, but national military organizations also converge in their goals and structures with every step of reform. These developments can be found in the East and in the West.

Overall, especially within the third wave of change European military co-operation has intensified markedly, even though it is still far from reaching an integrated understanding of a common security policy. With the Rapid Action Force the EU established a military core for its Common Foreign and Security Policy (ESCD).

National defence strategies are more and more replaced by Europe's common Safety and Defence Policy and this ESDP has definitely intensified over the last 10 years. Even if national interests continue to hinder common strategies, politics and actions, joint operations and multinational corps go without saying today. And no one seriously will deny that an effective safety and security politics in Europe is a joint European one.

Changed tasks and duties of today's military and officers lead to a

- **Convergence to civilian society**
 - Professional profile and specialization
 - Viewed as part of the public services
 - Criteria: costs and effectiveness
- **Divergence from civilian society**
 - Challenge of conscription
 - Loosening relationship between citizens and army

Source: HALTINER, KLEIN: The European Post-Cold War Military Reforms and Their Impact on Civil-Military Relations

Graphic 7: The officer's professional profile has become more civilian and distinct at the same time

What is the impact of these reforms and developments?

There is a strong trend towards professionalization of the military.

Defence of national territory has become a task of secondary importance for the European armed forces. In international missions officers have to act as policemen, guardians, diplomats, judges etc. but less frequently as soldiers, the role for which they have been trained. They control borders, fight against organized crime and protect institutions or strategically important civil infrastructures etc. As I have already stated, within the Territorial Defence Triad: protection of territorial integrity, international crisis management, support of civil authorities in the case of unforeseen events – the ranking has changed.

In the public the armed forces are less seen as conveyors of national pride and cohesion, but more as a part of public services like any other state institution. And they tend to be measured by the same means – costs and efficiency.

With the end of conscription in many European countries and the discussion about it in the remaining ones, the quantity of people having the chance to experience the military personally decreases considerably. Thus, the former close relationship between citizens and army is getting looser quantitatively. And – with a growing social distance as a consequence of this – relationship will also loosen in a qualitative way.

So we have a contradictory situation: On the one hand military structures begin to aim at civil ones and are measured by civilian means of cost and efficiency. On the other hand the growing quantitative and qualitative distance leads to a new distinctive self-conception as military that could be characterized in terms of re-militarization.

In an investigation of Caforio and others about value orientations of cadets and socialization in European military academies this contradiction can be found as well: (Guiseppe Caforio (ed): *The European Cadet. Professional Socialisation in Military Academies; A Cross-national Study*, Baden-Baden 1998).

The concern of young Europeans to become an officer is still influenced by more traditional motives: interest in the military, they want to play their part in serving their nation, looking for adventure, because of military ethics.

National differences exist between cadets from ex-communist countries and cadets in the remaining countries: the answers of the former display higher

percentages than those of the latter which can be defined as post-traditional, they see opportunities for education and training, they want to be independent or act as a teacher, they are interested in technology and engineering.

By contrast, the model of an officer that European cadets have in mind appears to be characterized mainly by the social aspects of the profession: leadership, responsibility, cooperativeness. A second set of characteristics can be classified as individual: stressing expertise, education, self-control. The more traditional military characteristics such as patriotism, bravery, and discipline, tend to receive less consideration.



Graphic 8: Who, if not Military Academies, can bring the Bologna Process to life?

Conclusion: the changes and developments since the end of cold war are a strong argument for a – at least partly – joint officer education in Europe.

More than in any civilian area, officers have to cooperate on a European and international level. Therefore, joint standards for and content of their formation would be helpful.

And in times of restricted budgets, existing funds have to be employed effectively. As armies and the number of officers decrease, it will soon become difficult for every nation to offer a high class education for their officers. So the idea to bundle and share competences suggests itself.

A higher degree of exchange, cooperation, specialization could not only improve officer formation in respect of content but foster the idea of a unified European defence policy as well.

This was one of the main themes of last year's Symposium "Methods of making officer training more European in the course of the Bologna Process".


Participants agreed that it is a desirable and sensible aim to closer cooperate in officer formation on a European level. Several syndicate groups thought about how such a deepened cooperation can be reached and how the process to reach it can be realized.

One syndicate group stressed the importance of a jointly to be constituted structure. Such a structure supported and accepted by all participating institutions and nations would contribute to unification but not at all to levelling down. Within a common structure different core themes are even desirable. A common European basic structure of officer formation could overcome limits of national resources and improve formation in general.

This syndicate group saw the constitution of such a joint structure as a first step. Further steps could then be the development of joint academic education to which existing military academies could contribute with different modules – according to their core themes and/or expertise.

On the other side syndicates discussed the question how a unified officer formation can be fostered concerning the contents. One proposition was to compare the different curricula and define a set of basic modules which are necessary for officer formation. Such modules could then be absolved at different military academies. To foster this project an exchange of teachers and researchers would be useful.

Critical point of such a project is the willingness to accept training modules offered by partner academies as equivalent. Without such an acceptance, cooperation will not gain the profoundness needed to accomplish such a demanding project.



Graphic 9: A virtual organization for European Officer Formation

After last years' symposium we have thought a lot about possibilities to go on further. And we developed the model of a Virtual European Military Academy.

What does that mean exactly? The term "virtual" has been a popular one since some years. The saying is of virtual reality, virtual classrooms, virtual organizations, virtual universities etc.

Together with this increased usage a shift in meaning has occurred.

If we take the the French term "virtuel" (meaning: possible, capable to affect) and go back to the Latin "virtus" (meaning: virtue, efficiency, potency, virility) we can say: virtual means a possibility, something that is not displayed overtly but already existing.


If we speak of "virtual" today we refer to an object or the feature of an object that does not exist physically but has functions or impacts that really exist.

So we can define "virtual" as that which is not real, but displays the full qualities of the real in a plainly actual – what means not potential - way.

The virtuality of the here conceived military academy refers primarily to organizational aspects and only secondly to aspects of teaching: the military academy as a virtual organization.

Virtual organization means that several independent persons, enterprises or institutions form a conjoint network. For third parties – clients e.g. – the virtual organization acts as a uniform company or institution. Virtual organizations optimize their services by collecting the specific competences of the partners. They can react flexibly, customer-oriented and competitive. Information and communications management and technology play an important part for these networks allowing them to overcome time and location. By combining their core competencies virtual organizations can be very effective.

The advantages of virtual organizations are often cited but their flexible loose and project oriented structure can be dangerous as well. The loose-fitting informal character of the organization may make control difficult. As partners profoundly depend on each other single partners may take advantage of the cooperation for their own benefit only. Sanctions for partners misusing the cooperation may be difficult to exert. So trust and long lasting cooperation are of crucial importance for a virtual organization.




Graphic 10: The virtual European military academy model

This cannot be a ready-made solution but is a complex development process. The virtual academy is an experiment that can only develop bit by bit.

So what do we mean if we speak of a virtual European military academy

It is the cooperation of several (from 2 to all) military academies to offer officer formation on an agreed upon European level. This academy does not need to exist physically – as one campus in one city in one country – to educate European officers in a cross-national way. Virtual means that there exists a common framework for really existing single military academies that enables exchange and cooperation.

Each participating military academy contributes with its campus, its capacities and specializations. Aim is to foster students' and teachers' exchange, to jointly profit from the excellences of the single partners, to offer a better formation in a more efficient way.



Graphic 11: The Virtual European Academy Model is a basic structure allowing diverse forms of cooperation

So, the main goal of a virtual military academy is quite clear: to realize the Bologna Process – to establish a European Military Higher Education Area allowing officers to absolve parts of their formation at different military academies which are part of the network virtual academy.

The virtual military academy is conceived as a common basic structure with a set of agreed upon principles, referring to content and quality of European officer formation.

Within the basic organizational structure and basic principles of the Virtual Military Academy different degrees of participation and cooperation should be possible.


The intended increased exchange between military academies does not per se mean that formation has to be harmonized 100 percent, that every academy offers the same program. On the contrary, it can open up the possibility to specialize, to focus on core themes and rely on other academies for other themes.

One possibility is to arrive at a common understanding about what are the absolutely vital elements of officer formation. These basics could then be defined in the form of educational modules with joint quality standards. Participating military academies could offer all or some of these modules. Students could absolve these modules at different academies and teachers could teach these modules at different academies.

Another possibility would be that academies just contribute with single modules that others cannot offer.

The model is open for stepwise expansion and increase of cooperation. Perhaps the last step will be a common European military education, but this is by no means an imperative.

Such an organization of formation makes modified demands on the participating academies. These refer especially to cooperation. For a successful cooperation, efficient and effective communications networks have to be established and used by the partners.



Graphic 12: As a system, a (Virtual) (European) Military Academy can be described by 8 elements

Elements of a military academy


If we think about a military academy, virtual or really existing we can conceive it as a system, consisting of different element.

These elements are quite abstract because they have to depict the organizational model of many existing academies (military as well as civilian ones). We have taken these elements as functions, whereas function in this context means a clearly defined area of responsibility within an organizational set-up.

The functions of an academy can be assigned to three domains: First, there is the core domain of an academy: teaching as well as Research & Development. Then there is a second domain which is important, too, but predominantly supporting: administration and services. And then there is a third domain: management and controlling. This is about information, knowledge and project management, about defining and controlling quality. The third domain is of special importance for a virtual academy, for any kind of cooperation. To successfully cooperate means to have a common understanding of these topics and to set standards binding for all participating “real” academies.

In a quite abstract way these are the components of an academy. I invite you to test the system: to apply it onto your academy and think about functions missing or being superfluous.

But before doing so let us look at every single function and get a shared understanding of what their meaning is.




Graphic 13: Teaching

1. Teaching

Teaching is to impart knowledge, skills and competences under pertinent quality standards.

So, in a first step relevant qualifications have to be defined as well as uniform standards how these qualifications can be implemented. On the basis of defined qualifications and standards, curricula can be developed and modules can be designed that impart these qualifications or parts of them. Academies have the opportunity to offer all modules or just some. Additionally, further qualifications can be imparted or demanded if this is part of national interests or academy profile.




Graphic 14: Research & Development

2. Research & Development

R+D refers to the creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, especially the organisational knowledge, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.

Partners have to define their main R&D efforts, they have to develop R&D projects, to conduct them, integrate their students into these projects and to document the results.

Here quite a range of possibilities for cooperation, specialization and integration of research activities and results opens up that may advance military research substantially.




Graphic 15: Information Management

3. Information Management

Information management can be described as the means by which an organization efficiently records, organizes, store, disseminates and retrieves information. By information management it shall be ensured that the value of that information is identified and exploited – get the right information to the right person in the right format at the right time.

So you have to identify the need for information, to plan the way to offer it and to organize supply of information. That is the supply side of information management. The other side is demand - the management of information already existing within the organization. It goes without saying that information is a vital basic element of academia. And it can easily be imagined that it is a vital element for any cooperation as well. From effectively disseminated and collected information within a scientific and educational network every member of that network – teachers as well as students – will profit.



Graphic 16: Knowledge Management


4. Knowledge Management

Often, there is no exact differentiation between information and knowledge management although it undoubtedly exists. Knowledge is more than information, it is about analysis, it is information brought into context, and into action, and it is closely linked to learning and learning organizations.

Knowledge management can be organized along a “lifecycle” of knowledge:

- **Create:** Knowledge must be created within or outside the organization.
- **Store:** It then has to be stored somewhere, so that it is accessible for others to find and use.
- **Find:** Those who need specific knowledge must find out where it is.
- **Acquire:** Once the knowledge source is found the user will acquire it.
- **Use:** Then the knowledge will be used and applied in some productive way.
- **Learn:** There will be results of knowledge used. These results and experiences will create new knowledge or change the existing one.

Knowledge Management is a framework, a strategy to consciously organize this cycle for optimal performance across all aspects. It enhances the ability to share experiences and the knowledge derived from that.




Graphic 17: Project Management

5. Project Management

Project Management plans, organizes, and manages resources in order to successfully complete specific project goals and objectives. A project is a finite endeavour – having specific start and completion dates. This finite characteristic of projects distinguishes them from processes, or operations, which are repetitively executed to produce the same product or service. The primary challenge of project management is to achieve all of the project goals and objectives while adhering to classic project constraints – usually scope, quality, time and budget.

Project management tasks are: Define projects, analyze projects (feasibility), let out project contracts, plan projects, conduct projects, conclude project contracts.

Project management plays an important role (or should play at least) with R&D projects, interdisciplinary projects or cooperation of different academies within a project.




Graphic 18: Quality Management

6. Quality Management

QM describes all measures that provide improvements of products, processes or any kind of activity. QM does not necessarily lead to a better result but concentrates on achieving defined quality standards. This quality can be deduced from standardised models (such as EFQM; ISO etc.) or from individual quality goals and the quality standards derived from them.

Quality management tasks: Define common quality level, define common quality standards, evaluate graduation certificates.

For a virtual academy QM plays an important role: definition of quality standards for formation, for teaching and to control compliance.




Graphic 19: Controlling

7. Controlling

Controlling is concerned with the provision of information for management decision making. It facilitates coordination, monitoring and optimization of all processes in an organization.

Apart from the documentation of actual events the main task of controlling is planning. By comparing the actual data with the planning data it is possible to determine variances.


Mostly, controlling is oriented toward finances. In our academy, however, it should concentrate on the core activities: learning, teaching and research.



Graphic 20: Administration and Services

8. Administration and Services

This function entails all processes of running a virtual military academy: students' take in process, faculty, public relation, and graduation process.



Graphic 21: Cross impact analysis

Cross impact analysis

In a first step we have defined vital functions of a virtual (military) academy. In a second step we can take into account the multitude of cross-linkages of these functions.

To get a quick picture a cross-impact analysis can be done. This is a rather simple method to get an impression of the systems dynamics.

In a matrix for every systems element is asked: how strong is its impact on the other systems elements? Rather simple evaluations scale: 2 = strong influence, 1 = weak influence, 0 – no influence.

When performing a cross-impact analysis, there are two things you should have in mind:

1. It is just the degree of influence that is evaluated. It is – for this analysis – of no importance whether it is positive or negative.
2. If the interrelations of two elements, A and B, are to be evaluated, one has to differentiate between the influence from A to B and the influence from B to A. Intuitively, we tend to mingle them.

You see a cross-impact analysis we have conducted. Here as well, you are invited to proof the evaluations and the result. Probably, you will not share

every evaluation. As you can easily see, the cross-impact analysis can thus be used as a tool to reach a common understanding of the elements of this system.

Results of a cross impact analysis


Our analysis comes to the result that the functions of the Virtual European Military Academy are strongly interrelated.

4 out of 8 functions are active: R+D, knowledge management, quality management and controlling. They have strong (above average) influence on others with only weak (below-average) influence exerted on them.

Teaching is critical, absorbing strong influences as well as exerting them.

Project management and Administration + Services are passive. They are mostly influenced by others and exert only a below-average influence themselves.

Information management is the only neutral element in the system, being quite independent.




Graphic 22: External influence factors

To complete the picture let us go one step further and look at the environment of our Virtual European Military Academy. There are external factors that can have impact on our system as well. We have detected the following:

- Scientific and technological developments
- Social values and norms
- Economic developments
- EU legal provisions
- National legal provisions
- National authorities


An influence analysis can be conducted similar to a cross impact analysis to get an impression of their impact onto the elements of our Virtual European Military Academy. But here, only the influence from outside onto the internal elements is regarded.



Graphic 23

In the influence analysis conducted by us, those functions of the Virtual European Military Academy which are most influenced by external factors are: R & D, Teaching and Quality Management.

The external factors with the highest impact on the system are: national university legislation and national authorities.



Graphic 24: A conceptual framework for concrete cooperation projects

So, how can this conceptional model foster specific cooperation among military academies?

Its functions are abstract and they have to be so because there exists quite a range of concrete possibilities to fulfil them. The model should be able to integrate most – if not all – off them.

A central part of the model lies in the development and definition of quality standards that are accepted and kept by all participants. As long as these standards or criteria are met the specific accomplishment can be quite different.

If we think of one the stumbling stones for the Bologna Process – diverging organization of studies at national military academies – this is of less significance as long as quality standards are met.

These standards and the trust that all partners stick to them are the starting point: To define teaching modules, to create and share knowledge and to realize conjoint projects.

As already stated, this or a similar model allows different forms and dimensions of cooperation. That is up to the partners, their interests and capacities – and the amount of effort they are willing to invest into such a partnership.

Thank you for your listening and patience.