

Military (and) Academy Contradictio per se or Conditio sine qua non?

by Karl Pichlkastner

Some preliminary notes

Here on the premises of the world's oldest Military Academy the pun or play on words is fully intended. Somehow when battering my brains for a catchy title, I was inspired by the ambiguity of the term *military intelligence*. Usually members of this prestigious service are made fun of by being asked, *military intelligence – isn't that a contradiction in terms?* Likewise, I asked myself the leading question whether these two concepts or worlds – the military and the academic world – exclude each other or rather are dependent on each other. So the purpose of my presentation is to provide a solution to this conflict between contradiction and condition. In doing so I will try not to lose track of the overall topic *Methods of making officer training more European in the course of the Bologna Process*.

As this is the kick-off speech I would like to provide you also with some food for thought on compatibility, interchangeability, or commonality of officer training and thus to achieve interoperability therein.

For the sake of providing you with the innovative power necessary to make best use of these thoughts and those to follow my German colleague Ms Rohrbach is going to familiarise you with the marvellous method of *Synnovation* yielding remarkable results with sound solutions.

Thereafter we will treat you to a decent lunch, which is followed by more food – for thought, namely on the security challenges we are facing.

Ladies and gentlemen, with such a heterogeneous audience like you, coming from all walks of life, I am fully convinced that our Symposium bring to fruition a more European – maybe even a European – approach to officer training.

Introduction

Now as we get down to the introduction proper we should ask ourselves how to overcome – through proper communication – the limits and boundaries of these two systems, i.e. the military and the academy or science that is.

The main part of my presentation is devoted to the differences between the two social systems of the military and science. This analysis will be conducted by way of the model of a social system (by Rupert LAY).

In the conclusion I will try to establish a synthesis as a response to future challenges. Such synthesis should pay a contribution to increasing the professional excellence or fitness of future officers.

Now back to our original communication issue of boundaries or barriers between the systems.

Do you know this one?

Joke (Courage)

Three Generals, from the Army, Air Force, and Marine, were standing in front of a rappelling tower with a Navy Admiral. The Air Force General says to the others, “My men are the most courageous of the Armed Forces.”

“Ha!” said the Army general, “My men have the most guts and I’ll prove it.”

He calls a Private over from the tower. He tells the Private, “I want you to jump off that tower - no rope, no parachute.”

“Yes, Sir!!!” the Private yells and proceeds to climb the tower. The Private walks to the edge, yells “Hoo-hah!” and jumps off the tower. He is killed instantly upon impact.

“That’s nothing,” the Air Force General says, bored. He calls a Senior Airman over. “Son, I want you to jump off that tower - no rope, no parachute and I want you to do it with style.”

“Yes, Sir!!!” the Senior Airman yells. He climbs to the top of the tower, walks to the edge and jumps. He executes a perfect swan dive like a prima ballerina, hits the ground and dies on impact.

“Hmhh,” the Marine growled. “You all obviously forget that the Marine Corps is here,” he said (yelling “Marine Corps!” as all Marines tend to do.)

He calls a Lance Corporal over. “Marine, I want you to jump off that tower and make the Corps proud!”

The Corporal yells, “Ooh-rah!” by way of response and runs to the tower. He grabs a submachine gun and an ammunition belt on the way and wraps the belt around himself. He climbs the tower and walks to the edge. Upon reaching the edge, he throws two grenades into the air, yells “Semper Fi, Do or Die!” and jumps off. He starts shooting the submachine gun in mid-air, clipping treetops and yelling the entire way down. His impact is obscured by the two exploding grenades. When the smoke clears, only little pieces of the Marine are left.

The others are impressed and nod their heads in admiration. Then the Admiral says, “That’s nothing.” The others turn to face the Admiral, their faces in disbelief. The Admiral calls a Seaman over who was cleaning latrines. “Son, I want you to jump off that tower- no rope, no parachute.”

The Seaman looks the Admiral in the face and says, “No way! You kiss my ass first!” and walks off.

The Admiral turns to the others and says, “Now THAT’S courage!”

Well, do you think this was successful communication? On the one hand one could argue that this cheeky Seaman committed disobedience or insubordination and that he should be court-martialled accordingly. On the other hand he could likewise be commended for his courage and receive a medal of valour.

Taking into account the definition of courage as

the state or quality of mind or spirit that enables one to face danger, fear, or vicissitudes with self-possession, confidence, and resolution.

the interpretation is open, depending on whether or not courage is just a temporary state or an inherent quality. Consequently, this difference in meaning makes up for the punch line of the joke.

The communication system of Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps is obviously different from the one of Navy.

Now moving on to the military and the academic world the question arises whether their communication systems work differently as well. Let me elaborate on that by resorting to Niklas LUHMANN (cf. *Lebende Systeme*, 1988, pp.10). He conceives communication as system in its own right. “This approach stresses the difference between psychological and social

systems. The former function on the basis of awareness, the latter on the basis of communication. Both are closed circuits that can only operate in the mode of the autopoietic reproduction. While a social system cannot think, a psychological system cannot communicate.” (ibidem p.16, translated) The communication system can only become operational by a synthesis of three selections. These are: the selection of an item of information, the selection of the transfer of this information and the information proper. It is only if and when these three components are combined that communication can happen including the ultimate decision whether the received information is adopted or rejected. Based on the decision taken further communication options open up. Now the recipient of the information can choose from the entire range of possibilities: from consolidating the consensus arrived at, to following up on the disagreement, to attenuating or avoiding tricky and controversial issues altogether.

Given the fact that society is a comprehensive and complex system of intertwined communication, which in a functionalistic way builds in itself subsystems like politics, the military, science a.s.o. These subsystems function on the basis of a communication system that can reproduce itself and that perceives the other subsystems as its environment.

The Austrian philosopher Konrad Paul LIESSMANN tries to explain them as follows (cf. *Armis et Litteris*, Volume 7. p.10, translated):

“These subsystems depend on two parameters: First on the self-imposed difference of the subsystem to the rest of the world and second on a criterion, in the sense of a means of dissociating itself from the rest of the world. Such criteria, means, or media usually function on a binary code and control the internal communication as well as have the final say as to what belongs to the system and what does not.” These codes take care of the operational boundaries of the system by establishing frameworks for the respective communication system to be perceived there from. To put it differently: they take care of the selection of such items of information that fits the sense of previous communication. In doing so the codes function as a mechanism for the reduction of complexity.

Take for instance the binary code of justice and injustice in the legal subsystem or belief and unbelief in the religious subsystem, payment and non-payment in the economic subsystem, being in power and not being in power in the political subsystem, obedience and disobedience in the military subsystem, or true and false in the scientific subsystem.

The phenomenon of complexity occurs, especially when systems lacking a common code need or wish to interact.

How could a scientist possibly manage to move from truth to obedience? How could a member of the military possibly understand that obedience alone is no *panacea*? “The more subsystems society develops the more complex it gets since the variants of interactions grow exponentially for which there is no code of conduct in place.” (ibidem p.10)

So returning to the previously asked question how to overcome – through proper communication – the limits and boundaries of two systems could be answered provisionally in the following way:

“It’s all about reduction of complexity, meaning it’s all about establishing links or cross-overs for their respective communication systems as well as about interaction between them.”

As learned earlier we should bear in mind that a social system does not suffice; it needs to be augmented by a psychological system.

Returning to our topic *Military (and) Academy – Contradictio per se or Conditio sine qua non?* we now feel that the contradiction part has to be taken with a grain of salt.

The model of a social system

The German philosopher and business consultant Rupert Lay (cf. *Über die Kultur des Unternehmens*, pp.8) has generated a model of a social system, which will be used for the following analysis.

The elements of social systems are specific interactions rather than men. Such interactions as exchange of acts basing on specific relations between and among persons occur within social systems or between, or among them.

Institutions, be they companies, associations, agencies, military or academic organisations a.s.o. hereinafter are referred to as “systems”.

Also LUHMANN (cf. *Soziale Systeme*, p.240) dwells on the condition of social systems when he states:

“When being asked about the set-up of social systems we tend to give a double answer, namely communication and its pertinent and congruent action. None of the two could have developed without the other.”

Interactions will always happen as interplay between the communication, i.e. the social system and the psychological system, which causes decisions on the basis of cognitive and affective procedures. These decisions manifest themselves in interactions, which in turn, contribute to the creation of reality.

Take for instance the handset that is slammed onto the cradle of the phone, following a wild and loudly exchange of abusive language. Or a disproportionate harsh critique of an essay, or – if the worst comes to the worst – the pushing of the release button for the unjustified employment of a tactical nuclear bomb.

Interactions produce signals that are further processed to information by our brain. They are linked to one another, caused by information, i.e. they result in actions based on the social system and the psychological system that in turn, serve as information for further interactions.

Not only do such interactions occur between humans within and outside the system, but also between and among the systems themselves.

Such systems come in three categories:

1. As inert systems, in which case they are reluctant to yield to any change and strive for maintaining or – if possible – even expanding themselves.
2. As autopoietic systems, in which case they internalise and store the rules and values for later use in the reproduction of interactions. Its structure becomes evident by way of specific language use, routines, and rituals.
3. As chaotic systems, in which case their effects affect their very causes and thus redefine and change the system. When arriving at a crossroads, however, they become unstable.

The agents of any system, of course, are humans that fully identify themselves with its structure and cannot respond timely to changed parameters in the environment. In order for an institution to be a proper social system its rules and values need to be internalised and externalised, otherwise its no more than a conglomeration of persons that look for their personal advantages.

Now that we have gone at some length to describe the model of a social system in general, let us become more specific and turn to the characteristics of the systems under scrutiny – the military and science.

Military and Science as Social System(s)

Following the definitions (abridged versions of the German Brockhaus Encyclopedia) of the terms military, academy, and science, an analysis will be conducted on the basis of the model of a social system by Rupert LAY.

*Military (from Latin *militaris*)*

The armed forces that are under a unified command which is responsible for its subordinates *via-a-vis* the state. Its members profess allegiance to a government or an authority, are commanded by a superior, have a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, are subject to military disciplinary law, and conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Its *raison d'être* is to wage war against an adversary or – ideally – not to need to go to the war in the first place by successful prevention, dissuasion, or deterrence. In recent years the military has experienced a change of paradigm – from classical offensive or defensive operations towards peace support operations and crisis management operations within a multinational community.

Academy (from Greek)

Originally, *Academy* referred to Plato's school for advanced education and the first institutional school of philosophy. The modern concept of academy encompasses institutions for the promotion of **science**, **education**, especially professional training (FH), as well as **research** and development.

Science

system of acquiring knowledge based on empiricism, experimentation, and methodological naturalism, as well as to the organized body of knowledge humans have gained by such research. The transfer of knowledge by teaching is also an integral part of science.

Education and teaching

activity of educating or instructing or teaching in order to impart state-of-the-art knowledge, skills or fundamentals of scientific research.


Research

Systematic intellectual investigation aimed at discovering, interpreting, and revising human knowledge on different aspects of the world. Research can use the scientific method, but need not do so. Documentation of its activities is to enable any reader to utilise or check on the findings.

The social system distinguishes itself from other systems autopoetically. As mentioned earlier each system orientates itself at the binary code. In the case of science it is the true-or-false code, while the military more or less differentiates between obedience and disobedience. That is why communication in the military consists of and boils down to acts of obedience and disobedience. Thus the military system is defined by decisions taken in accordance with this code.

When it comes to interactions with other systems, the military is structurally linked to the political system, since it represents its enforcement power.

It stands to reason that science will only interact with those systems that have a vested interest in the knowledge retrievable. At first sight or *prima vista* there are no distinctively close links between the military and science.



Model of a social system by Rupert LAY (ibidem p.9, translated)

The military system is structured as the dialectical pair of the General Being and the General Awareness, with the former determining the social conduct within the system, the latter being responsible for the creation of corporate values, expectations, interests, and requirements.

The General Being is governed by military rules and regulations that provide in an orderly way for the optimum deployment of the required forces, properly armed and equipped, to the right place at the right time. (It's almost as simple as playing the piano: you only have to hit the right key at the right time.)

The social conduct in the military is determined by hierarchical structure and the chain of command, by order and obedience, as well as by secrecy and security. The military profession is characterised by war-time conditions like extreme emergencies, physical hardships, mental, stress, danger of life, a.s.o.

By constantly applying military courtesies, customs, and rituals, the system draws and reinvigorates its cohesive forces.

What a difference to the General Being in science:

This system features flat hierarchies, full academic freedom, a scientific discourse, autonomy, transparency, a.s.o.

Thus one cannot but realise that the two systems differ greatly and can hardly be compared to each other. It's like Huntingdon's *Clash of Civilisations* if I may say so.

What a difference to the General Awareness as well:

Take for instance the virtues discipline, bravery, courage, loyalty, camaraderie and the commitment to welfare – they are held in high esteem in the military while values like criticism, reflexion, and argumentation as well as their prerequisites, namely autonomy and distance are in high demand in science.

The internal environment of the social system is augmented by its members or agents, who orientate themselves at the norms of the General and internalise the values of the General Awareness (i.e. the culture of the system).

It is of quite important how the structures of the system relate to values, expectations, interests, and requirements of the members of the internal environment. The system adapts to the structures of the internal environment with decelerating factor 1 (DF 1).

If this is successful and if the structures are attractive, they will be internalised with the decelerating factor 2 (DF 2) by the members or agents of the system.

The members of the military system are more reluctant to adapt than their scientific counterparts since established traditions and hence conservatism plays an important role. They will only adapt if the survival of the system as a whole is at stake.

Science, on the other hand, seems to be more willing to adapt as the system is more heterogeneous and hence more competitive.

While the military makes an effort to account for decelerating factor 2 (DF 2) by stressing military education, science does not allow for such a measure.

The external environment of a system is formed by the interfaces to the external environment. These interfaces develop spontaneously by themselves and are not dependent on the intentions of the system agents.

Such interfaces are those that are considered conducive to the system, namely the values, expectations, interests, and requirements. These cause the structures of the system to adapt with decelerating factor (DF 3).

Decelerating factor (DF 4) describes the possibility to create an external environment that is agreeable to the social system.

One interface within the military system may be represented by the armed forces of allies or partners, with whom one has to embark on a multinational operation or may also be represented by civilian disaster relief organisations, with which one has to embark on CIMIC.

All in all, the military does not seem to have an all too great vested interest into interactions with other systems.

With science, things are completely different: As there is the ever-present need to generate knowledge in each and every field of study, one cannot but search for interfaces to the respective systems and to use them as the external environment. That is why the decelerating factors 3 and 4 are of greater relevance than in the military.

The incomprehensible world are those spheres of the external environment the reactions of which are not understood by the system. Nonetheless the system may be exposed to its pressure or may try to convey its own values to it, to the incomprehensible world that is.

Whenever say the media give the military a sound dressing down on a relevant occasion, it becomes obvious that system – not even with the tightest perimeter defence – cannot be totally sealed off from the outer world and that it needs to face the ever-growing communication network.

In such an event the system with more liberal structures will prevail.

This concludes my comparative analysis of the two systems, the military and science, resulting in a swing of the pendulum towards *Contradictio per se* rather than *Conditio sine qua non*.

A Possible Synthesis

The analysis just conducted on the two systems – the military and science or academy – has clearly ruled out commonalities between them. Thus it is of little, or no use at all to combine the two into the compound word *military academy*. The combination of the two concepts is obviously not the combination of its characteristics. But still there is the concept of *military academy* and the question arises as to whether it's more military or more academy.

A *military academy* is an educational facility of the army for the basic training of officers. It is to prepare them for their first posting following commission (usually platoon leader, executive officer, or officer specialist) and for further training, e.g. general staff course.

This is the theory, but in practice military academies differ greatly.

Take for instance the Theresianische Militärakademie or Theresan Military Academy (TMA). Its mission is threefold: first there is the FH-Diploma Programme Military Leadership as the basic training for Austrian officers, then there is the Institute for Advanced Officer Training, and finally there is something like an officer candidate school or a green-to-gold programme to ensure competition.

On top of the TMA there is the Landesverteidigungsakademie (LVak) or National Defence Academy (NDA) that provides for higher officer training, research and development, as well as for knowledge management.

The Swiss counterpart, die Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich (MILAK) serves not only the purpose of basic and further officer training for the professional cadres, but also as a world-renowned competence centre of military sciences.

Consequently it reports to the Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule as regards science and to the Swiss Army's Higher Cadre Training militarily.

The German Bundeswehr draws a clear-cut line between military and academic training. The former is provided by the Offiziersschule or officer school of the respective service (army, air force, navy), or by the Medical Academy, the latter is taken care of by the civilian-pattern universities of the Bundeswehr. The exception to this rule is the Führungsakademie in HAMBURG as it combines military and academic training to cater for the needs of (general) staff officers.

If we move across the Channel, we can touch upon England and its splendid isolation, since the Royal Military Academy (RMA) at Sandhurst does not offer academic studies. Ever since 1992 the RMA has been instructing male and female candidates with or without university degree in a uniform training system, the Commissioning Course. Thereafter, officers attend three courses, organised in trimesters or terms and lasting 44 weeks each.

Just by presenting these hand-picked examples gives you an idea of the wide range of possibilities. It certainly does not contribute to finding an answer to our initial question *Military (and) Academy – Contradictio per se or Conditio sine qua non?* A genuine and veritable military academy would need to be a combination, a synthesis of the two.

If this synthesis cannot be attained, some would be more military in academic-scientific disguise, some would be more university with a military look, maybe with a trendy camouflage paint.

The major difference to other systems is that the military ultimately is to defeat another system. In such a war-time scenario the binary code for interaction with the adversary is victor or vanquished.

In the olden days of the Middle Ages there was a straightforward battlefield paradigm, many officers yearn for. Then the life of the military was easy as interactions with other systems were scarce or could be avoided altogether.

However, things have changed drastically, with intra-state conflicts on the rise, multi-dimensional, complex, and blurred situations, and a plethora of actors and stake-holders.

In such an environment it is extremely tough – if possible at all – to establish stable social systems given the vicissitudes of war and the lack of time.

What will the future military operation be like, if, to quote Van CREVELD, nation-states will have outsourced their force monopoly to insurgents,

terrorists, criminal gangs, ethnic minorities, or religious fundamentalists, where there is no front line, no distinction between combatants and non-combatants, no code of conduct.

Anyhow, military interactions may affect various systems. Shelling a media centre or razing a refinery may have consequences, by far exceeding a purely military purpose. A military operation should serve the purpose of projecting force as well as bringing peace to a conflict-stricken region, thereby stabilising the affected systems. As this stabilisation proceeds, military measures may give way to civilian ones. That is why CIMIC plays an ever-growing role. Any set-back in stabilisation process will cause an adjustment in the selection of the appropriate tool out of the tool box. The use of force must be commensurate with the scenario.

The time-proven code victor or vanquished seems to become obsolete or at least obsolescent. It needs to be replaced by the code sanctioning or no sanctioning.

The norms of the system structures for the differentiation between obedience and disobedience need to adapt with the previously-mentioned decelerating factors in order to foster autonomous action on the part of the military leaders.

Officers in particular, must be able to act in the face of imminent danger. They must be fully aware of the consequences of their interactions. That is why they need to act and interact responsibly, based on decisions that are soundly deliberated and checked upon the true-false code.

Interactions make up the reality and make such limits visible that are beyond our sphere of influence.

The philosopher H.G. FRANKFURT (cf. *Über die Wahrheit*, 2007, pp.88) hits the nail on the head when he states, "As we gain a better understanding of how we are limited and of how our limits are limited, we manage to set our limits and to recognise our shape.

We learn what we can do and what efforts we need to make for the attainment of the possible. We get to know our strengths and weaknesses, which reinforces our feeling of autonomy. It defines who we are in the effect."

First and foremost the value of truth is of instrumental nature, if you take it in dribs and drabs since it is the individual truth that is useful.

The pragmatic value of truth manifests itself in the technical expertise of the military leader and in the decisions justified by that expertise.

Thus it becomes more and more evident that the military system has been infiltrated stealthily by the social system of science. Officer training is thus to be comprehensive enough to equip the graduates with the sound knowledge necessary to assess the consequences of their interactions even in the most complex of situations. This includes a change of the established social conduct on the odd occasion. Irritations should be seen as an indication for a new chance of insight to loom ahead.

In concluding we can state that the military and the academic world **do not** exclude each other. However, it is the very difference that lends itself to achieving synergy effects in officer training.

Now that I have rested my case you decide yourselves whether you are a member of the

Military Academy or Academic Military.

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The Challenges of International Security in the 21st Century for Europe – the Union and Beyond

by Christian Stadler

*If you know yourself as well as your enemy,
then you do not need to fear the result of 100 battles. (Sun Tsu)*

The challenges of International Security are a never-ending topic. If you want to be up to date in this field you have to reformulate your *political* considerations almost all ten years. In 1990 the Global Cold War was over and peace seemed to return back to the World. The USA seemed to remain the only “Global Super Power” able to act (means: to intervene) almost everywhere on the planet. A “New World Order” seemed to arise after the First Gulf-War in 1990/91 showed the overwhelming superiority of the classical war power of the USA as did the ten years later taking place NATO-war on Serbia (Kosovo Crusade) ending the since 1991 taking place bloody conflicts in Ex-Yugoslavia. But already 2 years later the global scenery changed dramatically: Al-Qaida waged a terrorist war-attack on the USA (9-11). Both year 2000 – “wars” had not been “typical” according to the Theory of War – Textbooks, but looking at them from a *philosophical* point of view helps to clarify the confusion of idea: NATO in 1999 attacked Belgrade in order to “free” Kosovo from Serbian Troops; Al-Qaida attacked 2001 New York and Washington with hijacked civil aircrafts, in order to reduce US influence in the Middle East. In both cases we see – in a classical manner – the bloody version of political will-breaking: the Serbian Government was attacked by NATO to break its political will to remain in their province Kosovo: that meant to force the Serbian Government to withdraw from their own state-territory in order to establish ethnic autonomy for the Kosovo. The “Justice” of the intervention faded away by the usage of unjust means (*jus in bello - problem*) and by continuing to force Kosovo out of the meanwhile new democratic Serbia, which has good chances to join the EU (*jus ad bellum – problem*). In 2001 the USA were attacked in order to withdraw as representative of the Modern Globalised Times from the Muslim World (to make it very short). The US-reaction was the Afghanistan-War (since 2001) and the Iraq-War (since 2003) and a smouldering nuclear-crisis with Iran (since 2005). The USA imputed

the Al-Qaida-Terror directly to the „Taliban Regime“ in Kabul (still with full European Support) and indirectly to the “Saddam-Husseini-Regime” in Bagdad (already without full European Support) and the Iranian Government to develop a nuclear war potential (internationalised crises in the framework of IAEA and UN). All conflicts – as the Balkans Wars did – remained un-peaceful, in the best case were “frozen”, in the worst (like Afghanistan) more losing control than “keeping peace”.

In the meantime the global power balance changed: Since 1990 China grew breathtakingly in the economic field, so that many observers described the 21st Century already as the “Pacific” one (after the 20th „Atlantic“ Century). Whether this means that we face a peaceful (“pacific”) century remains undecided – the Atlantic Century was a very bloody one and the last since the 17th Century of Global European Hegemony. The USA face radical problems concerning their economic strength and political effectiveness, the Chinese practice an exploitative growth and Russia recovers step by step (since the decline and fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991) profiting from enormous high prices for Oil and Gas (due to Chinese and Indian economic growth) and comprehensive reforms of state and society after the Crises of the late Yeltsin-Years due to successful Putin-Reforms. Therefore one could estimate a new multi-polarity in international relations: USA – China – Russia as the key players on the political scenery. As emerging powers one should take into consideration India, Iran, Brazil and Nigeria. And never to forget is Japan, which plays not really an active role in international political relations, although being a leading economic power of the planet. A special dimension is the “Asymmetric Warfare” of and against International Islamistic Terrorism, which implies new strategies of war and peace. The most important remark on “Terrorism” is that this is not an “irrational”, “hypercriminality”, but a very special way of waging war – using the global mass media to transport its political pressure plots.

Structure of the Lecture

Regarding all these aspects of global changes in the last 20 years, the question arises, how the European Union – an economic superpower – should define its position in the global scale and which challenges it has to meet. In order to answer this question, we have to work out and to reflect different moments of these “challenges” – a task which cannot be completed during a 30 minutes presentation or a 10 pages paper. But we can at least

name those moments, which should be addressed in order to define the nature and dimension of challenges the European Union has to face in the decades to come:

- A The Demographic Dimension:** *if there is an enduring imbalance between exploding and imploding societies – there will be war*, which means that the human condition of a society is a key factor in international relations – dying societies may not expect to play a winning role in international relations.
- B The Military Dimension:** *if there is an enduring imbalance between strength and weakness – there will be war*, which means that peace is depending on a holistic approach towards the international relations, too; single cause explanations do not meet the analytical challenges in international politics.
- C The Supply Dimension:** *if there is an enduring imbalance between demand and supply – there will be war*, which means that you should never underestimate the “biological survival” dimension of the reality of war and peace between food and oil.

Principles of the Lecture

In order to open the mind for philosophical reflection, there shall also be provided three thoughts of leading philosophers of the European Tradition – addressing the question of war and peace and society as a whole. These three authors represent the classical European thinking from its ancient beginning (500 BC) up to the birth of modernity in Europe (1800 AC). They are addressing the metaphysical, social and political character of war and conflict.

Heraclitus: *“War is the father of all and the king of all”*, which means (in terms of modern Natural Law Theories) that War is the state of Nature and Peace is the state of Culture. With that sentence Heraclitus is addressing the key factor of Western thinking: conflictuality as the activistic metaphysical motor of the Being. Eternal change and everlasting dynamics as constant factors provide us with the necessary “stability”.

Plato: *“If Reason is governing than we have harmony in human relations”*, which means that if we have disharmony or imbalances in human relations than Reason remains silent on earth and war rises his bloody voice. It was Plato who Europeanised the key Eastern (Asian) contemplative principle

of Harmony – into the context of the activistic-conflictual West and built on that a Dialectical Eurasian approach towards reality: Idealism.

Clausewitz: “*War is the continuation of Politics by different means*” which means, that the Nature and Vocation of War is not to kill many people, but to break the enemy’s political Will. Clausewitz addresses the true political nature of war – neither being a crime nor a slaughter, but a human act with intention and responsibility. Clausewitz also means to us: if you could *not* break the enemy’s political will you have *not* (yet) won the war!

A. The Demographic Dimension

A.1. Europe is characterized by *imploping* population – in 2017 the demographic turning point will be reached and the Demographic crisis will be visible for the broader public, too. The European culture (within and outside the EU) will not be able to sustain its existing demographic level (of 20th Century figures) any longer and we will face the implications of an „aging society“ – especially the political and cultural consequences: such societies (about 1 billion people) are shrinking, old, rich and saturated and therefore not longer able to wage war – this may be a very positive result of such a development, but if you are living on a planet where all the other cultures (about 5 billion people) are growing, young, poor and hungry – this might be a frightening perspective in the light of structural migrations of people.

Africa, Asia and Latin America are characterized by an *exploding* population – many times more growing than the social infrastructure may stand up to, which causes enormous problems – problems the Europe of the 18th and 19th Century mastered by “mounting” their ships and conquering the other continents. Nowadays the population of the world is enormous fast growing – and they are the overwhelming majority on earth. The aging societies are not able to compensate the demographic surplus of the growing societies (even if they wanted to do so – it is *de facto* impossible).

Increasing migration is the consequence of that– and Europe is one of the most attractive destinations of that global mass movement, although Europe is neither willing, nor prepared, nor able to host all the migrants to come in the 21st Century – so what will be the “natural” consequence of all that: wars about land, territory or “Raum” – again and again the compulsive motive for existential war-waging.

- A.2. But “Demography” means more than only population growth rates, more than mere *quantity*. It also deals with the spirit of the population, with their culture, with *quality*. Europe is therefore not only characterized by an aging society, but also by an every day growing extent of secularization. Almost all European “Values” are to be defined as “*Democratic virtues*” in the (critical) sense of Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Fichte and Hegel. As Tönnies put it: we face more and more quantitative “*Gesellschaft*” (society) and are losing ground in the field of qualitative “*Gemeinschaft*” (community). The classical critique point vis-à-vis “Democracy” is the aspect of selfish individualism, which makes it almost impossible to argue unselfishness in a “public” and therefore rational context. Only the reference to private religious convictions and other “metaphysical” beliefs allows addressing the topics of community, solidarity and mercy. For the rational discourse only interests are rating, interest and use and profit. The more commercial values Europe gets, the more it loses spiritual values. This seems to be an anthropological rule, which is true not only in Europe, but everywhere, where *economy* and *technology* are the new Lords. Africa, Asia and Latin America are on the other hand characterized by an every day growing extent of spiritualisation. Islam is growing worldwide, and also a kind of Out-of-Europe version of Christianity: or better Christianised version of 19th and 20th Century Ideology – be it the *Marxist* sense (“Theology of Liberation”) or the *Liberal* sense (“Free Churches”) – the Classical European Version of Spirituality is about to die out – not only in the aging society of Europe, but also globally.
- A.3. Besides the spiritual aspect one should also take into consideration the magnetic energy field lying in the tension of social welfare and social poverty. Europe is characterized by an increasing extent of welfare and social security. The average per capita income runs up to between 6.000 \$ and 30.000 \$ – including already the “poorer” states of Eastern Europe. Within Europe the western part is richer than the eastern part, but the eastern part has the higher growth perspective. All in all this is – economically – quite a comfortable situation for a east-widening European Union. Many people in the EU have not yet seen this dexterous balance between West and East Europe which provides Europe – in spite of his dying markets – slow but steady growth of its Economy.

Asia, Africa and Latin America are characterized by an also increasing extent of welfare and social security – but starting from a cynically low level of about between 600 \$ and 3.000 \$ and boosting partly too fast to develop substantially and therefore overheating their economies without the adequate social (infra)structure. Both the social and the ecological costs are shocking – in the eyes of the highly developed societies. All these developments include the aspect of “consuming” which origins in their character of being “urban” economies.

The very special aspect of this imbalance is that due to internet and global in-time communication the poor and young and hungry learn about their poorness and what is more, also about the richness of the rich and old and saturated. This produces global tension and – in the long run – also migration. This is a key challenge for Europe, which has to be realised, analysed and met – if there might still be a way out!

B. The Military Dimension

B.1. The Military is the most powerful means of international politics – to be precise: the Military is far from being all of Politics, but without Military, all Politics remains ineffective and therefore useless. Politics is about influencing and – in the sense of Clausewitz – of changing the opponent’s political will. It is clear, that you should not misunderstand this approach towards Politics as “militaristic”. It is in a certain sense “realistic” – which means that Schmitt is not wrong working out that Politics is about the tension of “Friend” and “Foe”. So you have to have a Human Will to influence by whatever means available, by culture & spirit, diplomacy, economy or military. Without the option of the use of military force, a state will not be taken seriously in the international scene. That does not mean that you will be very influential only with a strong military arm, but without cultural & spiritual or diplomatic or economical competence – in this case you won’t be able really to influence your counterpart and really to solve international problems.

There has to be a military force in order to guard the State against militarily structured attacks. These can be “classical” attacks of foreign armies, or attacks of guerilla fighters or attacks of terrorists. What makes the use of force a “militarily structured attack” is the intention of the attack to threaten the State system as a whole (political

intention) and not to gain unfair advantages within the State system by the use of force (criminal intention). If this political intention is realised by an open battlefield fight, or by hidden guerilla actions or by an open terrorist attack – this is a second question. The big difference between guerilla and terrorist attacks is: as the guerillero wants to fight in the dark (without being seen) against the superior army, the terrorist is looking for the mass media presence, because his symbolic attacks against aims of public interest (military or civil) need news coverage. Otherwise they would miss their aim and be without almost any political effect. The guerillero may reach his aim without news coverage better than with it, the terrorist reaches almost nothing without adequate news-coverage of his action. The result out of this is that you have to understand Terrorism also as a variation of warfare – and NOT as a version of crime!

Therefore the Military has to fight terrorism and not the Police – it is the Military’s “natural” vocation to guard the State as a whole against politically motivated attacks from “outside” – of not only the territory (this is the classical case), but of the juridico-politico system of the State.

- B.2.** What is the difference between a “guerilla” and a “terrorist” attack? The guerilla fighter does not act according to the rules of warfare ... but he wages war in order to break the political Will of the enemy by military means (e.g. blasting a bridge in order to interrupt the enemy’s ammunition supply). He does this – as was stated before – perhaps in the dark, with civil clothing and without regarding any rules. But what is the key aspect: generally speaking Guerilleros are attacking military targets of a superior power in a way of asymmetric warfare. Even if nobody reports his action, he may be successfully by reaching his aim – weakening the opposite army or infrastructure.
- The terrorist fighter does not act according to the rules of warfare ... but he wages war in order to break the political Will of the enemy by thrilling the democratically relevant public opinion (e.g. blasting a well known bridge in order to frighten everybody using bridges in the future). He does this – as was also stated before – in the light of the news coverage, also with civil clothes and without regarding any rules. But what is the key aspect: generally speaking Terrorists are attacking publicly sensible public targets of a superior power in

a way of asymmetric warfare. If nobody would report about his attack against the publicly sensible, but mainly symbolic target, than the terrorist would not only *not* have reached his target – the terrorist attack would not have taken place at all in the political world.

- B.3.** In order to defend a society against terrorist attacks successfully, the Military has to be smart enough to know more about the society to guard than about the terrorists attacking. One should not underestimate the structural vulnerability of modern societies and States. The higher a society is developed, the easier this society may be attacked in a terrorist way. Often you need only a minimal “input” in order to paralyse a highly complex social unit – may it be a traffic system (like railways, airports, Underground trains etc.) or a supply system (like water supply or energy supply) or information systems (Telecommunications like Cable Information Systems and Internet). This high vulnerability is a very critical consequence of our high civilising development.

In order to fight the terrorists in their homelands, the Military has to be smart enough to know more about the origin societies of the terrorists than they know about their own homelands. This means the Military has to develop a high grade of hermeneutical competence. They have – contrary to the academic tradition of philosophy in the light of blood and death – to do serious and tabooless research work concerning the socio-cultural background and world-view of the terrorists. The first principle has to be so far: *don't confuse explanation with excuse!* If you want to win, you have to understand. You have to be enlightened enough to take the point of view of the counterpart without siding with him. Never believe to be clever by judging the terrorists as “irrational”, “criminal” or “evil”. This is a bloody mistake, which helps the terrorists to hide their often very rational and strategic intentions and therefore prevents the Military to win in a political sense of breaking the will. How can you manage to break a will, which you do not know at all?

To put it short: what the Military needs in the 4GW is Culture Competence – in order to become aware of the sense beyond the technical sound and to be able to win a war – and not only to destroy infrastructure and deploy man and material into crises regions like failed states. Brain without power is empty, but power without brain is blind (loose to Kant's epistemology).

C. The Supply Dimension

C.1. The third category of conflict-challenges deals with the basis structure of “civilisation”: if there is an imbalance between demand and supply – we have three options how to react in order to overcome this imbalance – which is in a sense a kind of disharmony, too:

We *increase* the *supply* by technical or economical means (“growth”) – and the tension will disappear ensuring peace and stability. This is the way the “West” acted since World War II in order to stabilise the societies towards the ideological threat by communism, which attacked the West not so much with weapons, but more with humanist dreams and paradise promises of a better world with just societies and eternal peace and happiness for all. In order to keep the people of the West “steady”, the winner of World War II (the USA) had to nourish – both with money and with means – the losers of World War II (Western Europe and Japan) against the second winner of World War II (the USSR). The result was endless growth – from year to year – the so-called “economic miracle” of the 50s and 60s. By the way – also in the Eastern part of Europe there was a “small economic miracle” – both ending with the Oil-Crises of the 70s. Here the West went over to the new world of virtual economics what the East was not able to do – twenty years later the east collapsed, because they could not longer supply their people adequately – in comparison with the virtual richness of the West. If you won’t believe this – please compare the “average standard of living” between West and East – after paying back the per-capita-debt in the West – and economic distances between “worlds” are melting away.

We *reduce* the *demand* by religious or spiritual means (“virtue”) – and the tension will disappear ensuring peace and stability. This was the European way of life during the centuries before World War II. As one says – Europe developed – due to shortness – a civilisation of renouncement, while the US developed – due to their “conquering culture” – a civilisation of consumption. This may be based on Calvinism, as Max Weber (“*ascetic Protestantism*”) pointed out – a version of Christianity, which had – as is generally known – to leave Europe in the 17th Century (*Pilgrim Fathers*). In Europe (*before imperialism*) one’s richness is obviously based on the poorness of someone else, while in the US one’s richness is obviously not at the

cost of someone else (of the socially relevant community of “white protestant families” at least). Therefore the US developed a culture of growth where “virtue” consists of success, growth and progress – while the European tradition developed a culture of shortage where “virtue” consists of less consuming and renouncing your demands. This very special approach to economic ethics may – by the way – be the substance of what is called “Globalization”.

If we do neither reduce demand nor increase supply – tensions will continue – and war will take place in order to reproduce balance again – either by destroying the demand through killing the demanding, or by acquiring more supply by conquering the possessing. This is the situation in the global perspective right now. World economy is characterised by a growing imbalance at all levels and Globalization is boosting the possessing more than it helps to poor to start to possess, too. According to John Rawls’ “*Maximin-Rule*” this economic inequality is not “just”, as it assists the rich more than the poor. And therefore Modern Times – from an economical point of view – are not by nature more peaceful than earlier times have been. And Europe has to clarify its position in this global situation.

C.2. In the global economy we do have an increasing imbalance of demand and supply of – let’s put it the analytically easy way – “energy resources”, a key figure in existential life supply means.

20% of the World Population consumed about 80% of the World Energy Resources at (no longer) comfortably low, but at least still affordable prices. But this inequality in Energy-Resource-Consumption may not last any longer. But for the last decades until the year 2000 at least, the gamble seemed to be won by the “West”. Growth and consumption of energy provided the developed West with all the necessary means to continue its way towards “progress” and global civilisational “hegemony”.

China and India are emerging economies and therefore increasing their energy needs by market means – therefore we realise higher prices for Europe and the USA, which changes not only the global balance to the “just”, but also the political and civilisational “status quo” of the modern world. Not by war, but by markets, is the West loosing its leading position in global economy – step by step. Due to the fact, that market democracies are based on the principle of mass

and majority, China and India – the first more as a market the second more as a democracy – are changing the coordinates of international politics. What is most: they show that these changes of political will (in the West) take place and are done without even using war – only by “civil” means of economic rules. This confirms Clausewitz, who said that there is no essential difference between “war” and “economy”, it is more a difference of means than of substance.

Sooner or later the global energy supply will no longer meet the global demand at reasonable resp. affordable prices for the West – and war will take place, if nobody reduces his demand in the future.

C.3. But now the secular LORD enters the stage: we do not need to reduce our demands nor do we have to wage our survival war. We simply have to invent new types or techniques of Energy production and management – and our consumptive “sins” will be forgiven and Peace remains on Earth, as balance and harmony is re-established, because there will be again enough energy for the West at reasonable prices. And we will not be forced to reduce our demands, as we will not be forced to wage war. The only thing we have to do is do research for new methods and techniques – to develop a knowledge-based, “better”: science-based society in order to master the future.

A very interesting aspect remains in this case: a majority of inventions done in the last 150 years have been taken place close to the Military complex. This due to the fact that the Military has political liquidity and no quarterly profit-pressure – what means that research can be better and more effectively done in the surrounding of the Military than in the light of “shareholder value” – expectations.

Conclusions for the to be united Europe

To sum all our considerations or flashlights: what are the consequences for the security situation of Europe?

- 1.) Europe does have a demographic problem
- 2.) Europe dose have a military problem
- 3.) Europe does have a supply problem

Europe should therefore start to tempt fate again – as it did after 732 or 1241 or 1648 or 1918 – and start a new period of self-determination of the Continent. What should have become clear through theses short reflections:

there is demand for immediate action in Europe! The situation is serious and expects a demanding and complex answer to be given!

The first step towards an answer to all these challenges can only be – to try to master them *united* – from Madrid to Moscow, from Reykjavik to Rhode, from Cadiz to Kiev. It is obvious that we cannot expect to have mastered the challenges alone and only through uniting Europe. But in the case Europe should have an own idea or plan or interest towards all these challenges, than the strategic precondition is that Europe is strong enough to globally impose its idea or plan or interest with power and seriousness. Because – as we already mentioned above –: without power the best ideas remain fruit – and therefore useless – mere declarations without any substance. And Europe remains more the object than the subject of international relations.

This has been the ingenious insight of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi already in 1923 – developing the Paneuropean Ideal of a *United Europe* in the Spirit of an enlightened Christianity – consisting of Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy. Europe has to be fit and therefore to breathe with both lungs – the western (Latin) one **and** the eastern (Hellenistic) one in order to be able to meet the described challenges of the 21st Century, and – what is most: Europe should not allow World Politics to continue its separation from its Eastern half – the to be united Europe should not longer suffer being divided and therefore being commanded from outside!

The European Vocation of Military Education on the Political Dimension of a Joint European Officer's Education

by Christian Stadler

Train hard, fight easy ... and win.

Train easy, fight hard ... and die.

(Marshal Aleksander Suvorov)

The key problem of today's European Union and its political challenges is that we are lacking a European Society. We do have European Institutions and even the Common European Market and Currency are working quite well. But these are "technical" or "bureaucratic" steps towards a united future of our continent. Who will be surprised remembering the founding period of the Decline-Europe after World War II. Within only 10 years after the all destructing World War II the enemies had to unite in order to build a new political order! That meant to declare the 30 years of bloody war and conflict before that not more than a big and tragic error! Only the breathtaking threat by Stalin's USSR and the fear that the Soviet System could prevail, forced the European Leaders together in the spirit of European solidarity – a solidarity of the weak and exhausted. In order not to endanger the Cold War motivated process of European Integration, nobody wanted to stress the spiritual, cultural or even democratic implications of that process. It remained a process of economists, technocrats and bureaucrats in order to avoid a public debate and critical reflection on the substantial aims and consequences of the Integration.

Now we have reached a moment which challenges this way in a twofold way: on the one side we "lost" the very near, immediate and plausible Soviet thread which forced the Europeans together and on the other hand we face now an intensity of economic, technocratic and bureaucratic integration, which needs – to be continued – the political dimension to be added in order to continue successfully. Otherwise we face the risk of disturbing if not destroying also the bureaucratic integration reached so far. The problem is – in the last 50 years of structural integration no spiritual or cultural or social integration took place. Europe remained a complementary dimension of unchanged and undisturbed national politics. The "shock" – as to be seen for the intentions to establish a European Constitution with democratic means

– is now for many people, that they do not understand why one has – all of a sudden – to accept the European Union as the key player in politics with overwhelming sovereignty over the Nation States.

The political problem is right now: we have to develop a Political Union, but without having so far an adequate Polis, we have to establish a European Democracy, but without having the corresponding European *Demos*. This is neither a big surprise nor the result of a kind of bureaucratic power conspiracy – but the logical consequence of the so far history of European Integration.

Therefore we have to go back to the roots of politico-philosophical thinking and to reconsider the socio-cultural and structural preconditions in order to develop the basis of such a urgently needed European Society and European *Demos*. Some basic ideas shall be shown in this paper.

Structure of the Lecture

- A. The Platonic Basis** – Military as School of an educated (European) Society – going back to Plato shows us that the (hidden) roots of European Society lie not that much in the Economy (as sphere of the “private”) than in the Military (as sphere of the “public”) – understood as part of the Paideia-Programme of Platonic Elitism.
- B. The Machiavellian Value** – Military as Backbone of a stable (European) Republic – after the centuries of the Middle Ages, which have pragmatically been founded on the Military Structures (Chivalry) and the therein based European Nobility, we find at Machiavelli a “modern” republican approach towards the relationship between society and soldier.
- C. The Clausewitzian Dialectics** – Military as Means of a self-determined (European) Polity – with Clausewitz we enter the Kantian Tradition between free will and responsible autonomy. For Clausewitz war has more to do with spirit (the will) than with materia (the destruction). Destruction is the means, the Will is the aim. And War is part of Politics and not the other way round Politics part of War.

A. The Platonic Basis

- A.1.** According to the teachings of Platon one has to differentiate between the “Politeia” and the “Nomoi”. The “Politeia” is Platos idealistic concept of a reason-based utopian society where justice might be realised. The “Nomoi” is Platos pragmatic concept of power politics

and shows how you should concretely manage a new polis-foundation (not a surprisingly topic in the greek polis-centered colonialism). The following teachings are taken from his “Politeia”. Platos idealistic concept of society knows three moments – analogue to his teaching of the human soul – and is a predecessor of modern “dialectics”:

Epitymetikon – INTEREST – the Economy feeding the Polis/State: for Plato this makes the huge majority of the society: about 85-90% of the population live a “normal” middle class life – having a family, owning private property, working and travelling, having fun and doing business. All the basic functions of a society are provided by that “civil society” – agriculture, industry, trade – whatever you want and whatever makes a modern society based on interest, profit and privacy.

Thymoeides – COURAGE – the Guardians securing the Polis/State: for Plato, the guardians are the institutionalised backbone of the society, the key actors of the “public”, although they are a quantitative minority, but without their service, the public life would collapse and the private life could not take place. Not everyone is accepted as guardian – only the best about 10-15% of the population can join in young years the guardians’ corps. A core characteristic of the guardians is that they are trained and educated all the time of their service, in order not only to keep them “fit”, but also to keep them growing in their “competences” – both physical and moral and intellectual. The guardians are not allowed to own property nor to found a family – both in respect to their task: to serve the community without any reserve. Whatever they need to fulfil their task optimally they receive from the *Epitymetikon*-economy. They do not have to work for money, but to serve for honour.

Logistikon – REASON – the Philosophic Leader ruling the Polis/State: for Plato, the leader of the state has to be a „philosopher“, that means a person who is fully developed in humanity. Fully developed means: fully developed mind and character, based on a lifelong process of learning, reflecting and training all aspects of humanities (the seven arts). But not only contemplative philosophical life is necessary to become a king, but also about 30 years of unblemished military service as guardian. This combination of courage and contemplation makes a perfect philosopher-monarch in the eyes of Plato. This is the way he wants to criterialise the personality of the political elites.

The *socio-dynamic principle* of Plato makes the point: Powerful

performance in Paideia/Education serves as criteria in order to select social elites, starting from an open access for all to the obligatory school system up to social advancement. All citizens of Greek polis (also women) are – according to Plato – able and invited to join the “public educational programme”: all children from 7-17 have to attend public schools and afterwards the best are (s)electd to enter the “Guardians’ Corps”. The others remain in the private sphere and manage their personal life, because they lack the key qualification for public service, which is more a question of character than of skills: to be devoted more to the sake of the community than to the sake of their own private individual wellbeing. To be precise: this is not a moral, but a pragmatic judgement, because community oriented people indeed do not succeed in the free market as profit oriented people do not fit into public service – *suum cuique!*

- A.2. The Platonic concept of Paideia (Education) knows again in an early “dialectical” approach three dimensions with key “virtues”. “Virtue” does not have a moral dimension, but means only a “habit”, a “behaviour” which is necessary in order to succeed in your special field of society:

Motivation – based on Interest/Epitymetikon: the key “virtue” of the Epitymetikon and therefore of the “Civil Society” is motivation, the will and the energy to meet your personal aims and challenges in life. You have to have plans and concepts and you have to find ways to realise them based on your own possibilities. You also need freedom of interest and freedom of action in order to fulfil your personal convictions. So to say – you have to run a modern life of business and progress.

Discipline – based on Courage/Thymoeides: the key “virtue” of the Thymoeides and therefore for the Guardians’ Corps is discipline. Discipline means in the short run to obey to orders given to you, in the long run to adhere to the ideals and needs of the community without “falling back” into privatism or individualism. As a disciplined guardian you should without pause work on your individual perfection – both in physical and spiritual dimension. Training and reflection, body and spirit are to be developed for many years. *Mens sana in corpore sano!*

Intellect – based on Reason/Logistikon: the key “virtue” of the Logistikon and therefore for the Philosopher-Monarch is intellect.

Intellect means not only theoretical ability of realising the *noumena* behind *phenomena*, the light behind the shadows – it also means highly developed character and morality. The philosopher-king is the leading guardian, the best of the best. At the age of over 50 years an elite-guardian might qualify for leadership. As the guardians, the philosopher-king is not allowed to have family or property – his life has completely to be devoted to the wellbeing and sake of the community. Although he has the highest power of all, he might be economically poorer than his servant. To imagine the very special position of the Platonic “Philosopher-Monarch” – compare the Roman Pope with this concept.

Due to Plato, harmony in these three factors leads to reasonable education according to the antique ideal of „Humanity“ – *Humanity Building*. It is the key concept of Platonic thinking that harmony manages the dialectical cosmos according to reason or “nous”. It does not make sense that everybody does everything a little bit – but better that the Epitymetikon-people do business, the Thymoeides-people do service and the Logistikon-people do leadership. So harmony solves problems only arising due to the fact that you have no harmony organized within society.

The precondition (“*conditio sine qua non*”) to realise this classical ideal of “Humanity” is to establish one’s life in the context of a “Polis” consisting of these three moments. In the present time we have to build up our lives in a European Polis in order to realize this ancient ideal. By the way, those who preferred not to engage in the Polis-Project had been called “Idiotes” in those old times.

- A.3.** The “Thymoeides-Factor” in today’s world is the Military and the Police (Public Security Services). In contradiction to modern liberal ideologies and dogmas, the State with its key competences of Military and Police is not a part of the problem of the Society, but the central cultural tool in order to solve the problems of Society. The Security is – according even to “liberal thinkers” (which is often forgotten in today’s political debates) the key competence and the key obligation of the State. The big question and challenge of today is not, *whether or not* to provide Security for Society with the help of the State, but *how* to do this in an adequate and reasonable way. And as we face more than enough crucial challenges in today’s world for the survival of Europe as a whole, we should remember the roots of European

political thinking and redesign the “State” as the adequate concept of organisation not only for our “Nation States”, but also for the European Integration Process and Unity to come. The easiest way to do this is to start with common institutions instead of common convictions. The key institution to be considered in this context is the Security Backbone of the peaceful living together of the European Society. For Plato, one of the essential functions of *Thymoëides* is social selection based on education. So the Officer – highly educated and competent – due to the founding father of European Political Thought – represents the Elite of the Polis. This means, not everybody should be “forced” into service, but the best of a generation shall have the right to join in order to serve. Than “service” towards the community, the Polis, will be understood as honour, and not as sour obligation disturbing the fun life of today and the business life of tomorrow. If we want to build a European Society we need European Elites. One of the core factors of European Elites should be a *European Officers Corps*. With that a sustainable first step towards the possibility of a European Polis would be done. But before that we have already to name some moments of the European Polis to come in order to make clear whom this European Military Elites are about to serve. Machiavelli might help us along with this problem.

B. The Machiavellian Value

- B.1.** In order to start with Machiavelli and the Military, one has to remember that not only today but since ancient times, there has been the option to choose between “compulsory military service” (conscription) and the “voluntary military service” (professional). The conscript army as the professional army has its advantages: the conscript army is cheaper and has more soldiers available, can quite fast be refilled in the case of severe casualties suffered in the battlefield. The conscription was the ingenious Napoleonic turn at the beginning of the 19th Century (levé en masse), which helped him to win over half of Europe. In this concept of conscription lies not only a military moment, but also a political one: soldiers are citizens in uniform – or better: citizens are soldiers in civil. The professional army is more flexible and available, can be more easily used for out of-area or even global interventions and war becomes therefore a business as usual instrument of national politics.

War does not that much harm the population of a state, more its budget, but not its every day life and existence. Professional soldiers are costing money also in peacetime and therefore “need” more urgently “something useful to do” than conscripts, who have a civil life and (re)join the military only in the case or state of emergency. So professional soldiers are more isolated from the Community, while Conscripts are a living part of the Community they fight for. Perhaps not that “professional” in manner and method, but with more “fire and fury” in their heart – in the case of an existential attack against the community ... and therefore in a “just case”.

- B.2.** Machiavelli was not only a famous political thinker and analyst at the beginning of the Modern Times, he also worked “practically” in State Politics. His most important political task was to analyse the two military system options (conscription or professionalization) available and to build up in practice the better one in order to fight successfully for his polis.

He found out that the conscription system is the better one for a “Republic” and therefore he built up such an army, which proved to be more effective in the battlefield than the Condottieri-Armies (= professional soldiers) of the enemies. So you one can see that Machiavelli worked out and practiced (in the relatively small context of his polis Florence) the adequate military System for a “Republic” – so to say a community, which tasks all of its members as existential for their political life.

The easy way would therefore be to “buy” soldiers for the European Union – the bureaucratic system buys new functionaries in uniform to do further jobs for Europe – without any political perspective and implication. But the “classical” way would be to build up – alongside a European Guardian System – a European Polis, based on those who are prepared to fight and die for it. As Machiavelli put it: A healthy and stable Republic is founded on a healthy and stable Military. So if we look back to the European Integration – what could we name making sense to the people to fight or die for? This is the key question and as we have in the European Union so far only a bureaucratic and technocratic market and standardization project, which has forgotten that it was built on the ruins of two World Wars between the leading European Nation-States, one really could start doubting whether there is any specific “European” Value worth to stand up for – with arms in

your hands! If we cannot answer this question we have indeed a very substantial problem in Europe as far as its Integration is concerned – and the Nation-States will prevail the competition of sense and sovereignty.

- B.3.** But let us look back again to the Renaissance master of politics: The main factor or argument for Machiavelli was indeed not a militarily one, but the mentioned political one. Most important for him was the “solidarity” and “commitment” factor which is the basis of a successful conscription system: the citizens of a Republic develop a serious “political” attitude and “feeling” for “their” Republic, if they have to face the option to kill and/or to die for this “res publica”. The “res publica” of the Italian Renaissance was not (yet) a Nation State (built on common traditions and culture *versa* another tradition and another culture), but economic unities with a pragmatic approach toward power and politics: citizens who had something to loose in insecure times were interested in a way how to organise their common defence – not against foreign devils or evil cultures – but against the political or economical hunger of the Italian neighbour-polis (like in Ancient Greek Times). Machiavelli found out that Republics are by nature quite aggressive towards their neighbours because public consent and therefore authorization roots in growing perspectives for the citizens. But as long as you cannot (technically speaking) manage qualitative growth, you have to organise quantitative growth – expansionist strategies.

So do we have something to loose in the European Union, which would be relevant enough to establish a European Army based on Conscription! Such a conscription-system could help to develop the polis-consciousness we need in Europe in order to complete and fulfil the ideal of European Integration.

Therefore as key factor in the perspective to build up a European Republic, a European Conscript Army should be organized. The key competence of such a European Republic for the Citizens (“Bürger” derives from “Burg”, fortress) should be “Security in a global perspective”, which can no longer effectively be provided by the 19th Century European Nation-States. But who should challenge peaceful Europe in a peaceful world? Nobody plans a war-attack against Europe, so how could one build up a European Military with conscription system? Perhaps Clausewitz can help us with this question.

C. The Clausewitzean Dialectics

C.1. Clausewitz teaches that War is a political instrument – used by Political Powers. War is a part of the Political Sphere, not something completely different from Politics. So as Politics takes place every day, also the sphere where War lies is active every day of history. According to Clausewitz the essence of War is not to kill many people but to break the enemy's political will. To kill many foreign soldiers might be an adequate strategy in the given moment to achieve your aim or goal. But it is not the goal in itself. The relevant aspect is the political implication of the destruction of the enemy army.

If Europe wants to be a political Union, the first step is to be aware of what is Europe's political interest and will. As to play a role in the political sphere, you have to have interests and the will to realise them. That is the game since the oldest times. So what the EU needs to work out are their (common) interests globally. This is an internal question for the bureaucratic apparatus (Commission) in Brussels and the European Council.

In this political context one aspect should not be overseen: Peace within Europe does no longer guarantee peace for Europe! This was true from the 17th to the 20th Century. But since some years, world war and peace talk do not address any longer questions of inner-European relations. The World takes place globally and old Europe might follow the developments commenting and accompanying them – but without commanding them any longer. So the key necessity is to work out and make clear what the global interests of the European Peoples united in the European Union are – and than one can start a European Policy which should in the end – based on an European Military – produce a European State (based on strong federal structures). But the starting point is the common politics and therefore also security challenges which Europe has to face – that means: the common political will, which Europe wants to realise globally.

C.2. If we have named and politically internalized these common policy and security goals of Europe than we have to think about developing a European Military in order to back these security goals of Europe. As these security goals of Europe are political ones, also the means to realise them should and will have to be political ones. It is not about killing many foreign soldiers, it is about being able to influence, to

dictate or even to break the enemies political will. In the Modern World of the 21st Century this means to have a flexible far reaching intervention force in order to intervene globally – in order to stabilise globally regimes – be it democratic or not. This speaks – from a pragmatic point of view against a conscript and for a professional Military system.

So such a European Army has therefore a double function: on the one hand to be strong and effective outside Europe to be able to break the political will of Europe's enemies or existential competitors. But in the same moment it has to be System-Building within the Union in order to develop a European political Virtue of serious (bloodily serious) Union-solidarity – the European Polis. For that we need a European Demos, a European Society.

- C.3.** The process of building up such a European Army should be inspired by the considerations of Clausewitz. His concept of the military as a political instrument implies the very special vocation of the officer: he has to be bridge between the Politics and the Battlefield caused by the Politics. He has not to be factional in the sense of “Political Parties” or “Ideologies” or “Dogmas”, but in the sense that for the Officer the Nation and Community and Patria and Homeland – short the already cited Polis – comes first. Therefore by definition the Officer is to be seen as the key advocate of the Polis – esp. if you understand him in the Platonic (Thymoeides) or Machiavellian (Republican) sense. He is a leader towards his soldiers and a subordinate towards his political leaders. According to Platon, the Officer is the Elite of the Military and therefore also the highest rank of social Elite. This is a very demanding position, not only in an ethical sense. Especially from Machiavelli's concept of a Citizens Conscript Military one can learn, that an Officer has not only in the Military context, but also in the Civilian Context the function of a “translator” – in a modern word of an “interface”, a communicative junction: he has to understand the Great Politics and Major Strategy and how to transform this into the “concrete” Battlefield Action. But he has also to communicate the Military System as a Cosmos of Values and Virtues – also for the civil life: it is quite interesting (and perhaps surprising) that the key competences of a good officer are also the key competences of a high rank manager in the business world. And that a good soldier

makes also a good co-worker ... so we realise that a “real” citizen of a Republic is indeed a soldier in civil – compare that to the classical Suisse approach towards officer, soldier and society.

Conclusions and Outlook

Europe needs a European Society, organised in a Republic and able to act effectively in a global perspective. Plato taught that Society Building is based on the Paideia-Selection of social Elites. Especially the Thymoeides-Factor (Military and Police) is mentioned. Machiavelli stresses the political impact of a Conscription System for the development of Republican Values and Solidarities. Clausewitz also stresses Education in the comprehensive sense of “Paideia” as key factor for the Military and its culture and welfare. So highest academic training of the Officers Corps is not only a “philosophical”, “political” and “European”, but also a militarily relevant task. So after these short reflections concerning the teachings of Plato, Machiavelli and Clausewitz, we discern that if we want to build up a European Army based on political reason the first pragmatic step has to be to provide such an Army with European educated and trained Officers. This should be – after all our consideration – the first small step towards a greater project, which will by no means work alone with this step, but without this step, the project of a political European Union surely will not succeed.